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I.

INTRODUCTION

Society wants more expenditures to reduce the risks of injury,
illness, and premature death associated with many activities, but
simultaneously it wants the fruits of those activities to continue to
be available at a low cost. To some extent, these goals are inherently in conflict. On occasion society may give vitality to the slogan
that human life has an infinite value,1 but it can do so only in narrow contexts and for brief periods. More often, artful self-deception is practiced to create the appearance of adhering to an impossible, but widely held, ideal, while in actuality lives are balanced
against dollars.2 Every societal decision requires at least an implicit valuation of human life.3
While it may be impossible, at a tolerable cost, to eliminate
accidents completely, society can reduce substantially the aggregate costs of accidents without necessarily increasing total spending on accident cost avoidance. An examination of three character* Professor of Law, University of Kansas; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.S., Lehigh University, 1965; J.D., University of Virginia, 1972. This investigation

was supported by University of Kansas General Research Allocation No. XO-0038. The author wishes to acknowledge the substantial assistance of M. Bums, T. McGarity, G. Calabresi, and M. Shapo, who reviewed and criticized earlier drafts of this Article. The author is
grateful particularly to P. Lowry, who originally suggested the need for an investigation of
this topic.
1.

G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITr,

TRAGIC CHOICES 187-89 (1978).

2. Id. at 136-39.
3.

See Green, Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment and the Law: Introductionand Perspec-

tive, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 901 (1977).
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istics of the existing cost-containment methodology demonstrates
how safety can be increased without an increase in safety-related
spending. First, society spends more on safety in some areas than
others relative to the potential for reduction of accident costs in
each area. For example, if some of the money now spent on airline
safety were shifted to school bus safety, more lives would be saved
without increasing total safety spending. Second, a large percentage of the money now spent to reduce accident costs is misdirected
and ineffective. The method chosen to control accident costs often
increases the cost of engaging in various activities without a commensurate decrease in accident costs. Third, the present methods
of encouraging safety have such high administrative costs that only
a modest fraction of what society spends in an effort to obtain
safety actually contributes to achieving that end. If these processrelated inefficiencies in society's mechanisms for encouraging
safety can be reduced, it is possible to come closer to the seemingly
self-contradictory goal of increasing safety while keeping the costs
of goods and services in check.
Society uses the legal system as its primary means of influencing the level of spending on accident cost avoidance. Through tort
law and safety regulation, the legal system places implicit values
on human life in varying contexts and translates those values into
either commands or inducements to reduce accident costs. As the
related problems of excessive accidents and high inflation have
been traced consistently to perceived flaws in the rules of tort law
and safety regulation, both legislatures and courts have focused
considerable attention on the operation and faults of these two behavior guidance mechanisms. Most analyses of the problem, however, begin with an implicit acceptance of the preexisting legal
structure and suggest modest tinkering with the rules applicable in
a specific area to respond to particularly egregious problems-for
example, the rules for recovery of damages for medical malpractice
as they relate to rapidly increasing medical costs. The result has
been a hodgepodge of ad hoc suggestions for incremental changes
in tort law or safety regulation as applied to particular activities.
The changes suggested are often inconsistent conceptually and
functionally, and most are too limited in scope to offer any real
promise for improving the allocation of safety-related resources.
Few studies attempt to analyze the functional utility of the basic
legal doctrines used in tort law and safety regulation. Since the
problems are global and are deeply embedded in the basic rules of
the present legal system, the narrow scope of most studies limits
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their value as a basis for constructive change.
Professor Calabresi's work is a notable exception to the generally limited utility of most modern studies of legal mechanisms for
encouraging safety.' In this Article, I attempt to build upon Pro-

fessor Calabresi's basic analytical framework.5 Identifying the flaws
in present systems of encouraging safety and demonstrating,
through the use of empirical evidence, the extreme distortions created by those flaws, I propose an entirely new approach to the goal
of reducing accident costs through the legal system.
II. THE

MARKET AS A MEANS OF INDUCING SPENDING ON SAFETY

No one seriously suggests that the market alone is effective in
all circumstances to induce adequate spending on health and
safety. Every society has found it necessary to supplement contract
law with tort law and direct safety regulation. It is essential, however, to analyze briefly the way in which the market treats safety
in order to understand the limits of contract law that necessitate
supplementary reliance upon tort law and regulation.
A.

Advantages of the Market

In theory, contract law alone should produce the optimal level
of spending on accident cost avoidance. Each individual can express a preference for safety by bargaining away something else of
value in return for a particular level of safety.6 The great virtue of
the market as a means of allocating resources for safety is its ability to accommodate a wide range of individual preferences and
tastes. 7 Each individual can choose, for instance, whether to save
money by travelling by motorcycle or to purchase greater safety by
using a four-wheeled, metal-encased mode of transport. Since values are highly individualized, the choice of purchasing more or less
safety is to a significant extent linked to the individual freedom so
highly regarded by American society. In theory, the market,
through the legal system's commitment to enforce voluntary bilateral agreements, can reflect any individual's preference for a high
4. See, e.g., G. CALABRESi, THz COSTS OF ACCDENTS (1970); G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBrrr, supra note 1.
5. I am greatly indebted to Professor Calabresi for providing the excellent analytic
framework which I attempt to adopt and apply in this Article. I must, however, assume full
responsibility for any distortion or misapplication of Professor Calabresi's analysis in this
Article.
6.
7.

Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
G. CALARESI, supra note 4, at 69.
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degree of safety while simultaneously permitting other individuals
to trade safety for convenience, speed, or whatever else the individual values more than an increment of safety. Significant practical constraints, however, limit the market's ability to perform this
function.
B. Limits of the Market
Four major factors impair the ability of the market to channel
safety spending into patterns deemed optimal by all: externalities;
transaction costs; limited cognitive ability of participants; and the
relationship of market choices to preexisting patterns of wealth
distribution." Each factor alone might be manageable; but together
they prevent the market for safety from performing satisfactorily
in many circumstances.
The externalities problem arises from the fact that many
transactions between two individuals have effects upon third parties whose interests are not represented in bilateral contracts.
Thus, for example, when a farmer purchases a pesticide from a
manufacturer, the interests of both the farmer and the manufacturer presumably are furthered by the transaction; this arrangement, however, may not at all reflect the interests of the farmer's
neighbors. Those neighbors may include beekeepers and pregnant
women whose interests are in direct conflict with those of the
farmer and the pesticide manufacturer.
It is theoretically possible to eliminate all externalities associated with an activity or transaction solely through contract law.,
All parties affected by the transaction could enter into negotiations, yielding a voluntary multilateral agreement that would further the interests of all. Unfortunately, this theoretically perfect
method of resolving the externalities problem is rendered unavailable in many circumstances by the second problem-transaction
costs. 10
8.

To this list, Professor Calabresi adds unemployment effects, monopoly power, and

"second best" problems. G.

CALABREsI,

supra note 4, at 78-94. I see no need to treat these

factors independently. Unemployment effects, to the extent they are not reflected in private
costs, are included in the general category of externalities. Monopoly and second best
problems are sufficiently troublesome for reasons apart from their effect on the market for
safety that they have been analyzed in detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Pierce, Natural Gas Rate
Design: A Neglected Issue, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1089 (1978).
9. Coase, supra note 6.
10. Solving the externalities problem through multilateral negotiations also requires a
mechanism for accommodating the problem of the holdout. Compulsory arbitration may
eliminate this constraint, but only with some compromise of the conditions required for
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It is far too expensive to attempt to identify all of the individuals potentially affected by a transaction and to permit each to
participate in the negotiations concerning the transaction. Consider, for example, the number of individuals with varied interests
potentially affected by a farmer's decision to apply a pesticide that
remains chemically active in a variety of organisms for years and
that can be transported by air, water, or ingestion through chains
of organisms. Because of the innumerable ways that countless individuals might somehow be affected by such a transient substance,
it is virtually impossible, at an acceptable cost, to take account of
everyone's interest.
The third factor is the limited cognitive ability of participants
in the bargaining process. Even assuming that all nontrivial individual interests in a transaction are represented in negotiations,
the resulting contract can be assumed to further the interests of
everyone concerned only if the parties are aware of all the implications of the transaction. This is rarely the case, and often an individual's lack of knowledge can have a profound distorting effect on
the resulting contract. Continuing with the pesticide example, consider the effect on the transaction and the assumption that it will
further the interests of all parties if the pregnant neighbor of the
farmer is not aware of either the teratogenic effects of the pesticide
or its transportability through air. These inadequacies can be remedied, of course, by improving the state of knowledge of each participant. Here again, however, enormous costs are required to disseminate information about even the most important factual
implications of some transactions only to those individuals with
nontrivial interests. These costs often render efforts at individual
education prohibitively expensive.,,
Participants' cognitive limits undermine bargaining effectiveness in yet another way. Cognition implies not only knowledge of
relevant facts but the ability to form rational judgments based
upon those facts. Thus, the assumption that bargaining between
the farmer and his pregnant neighbor will yield a voluntary transaction that will further the interests of both requires not only that
the pregnant neighbor be aware of the teratogenic risk associated
with the pesticide but also that the neighbor be able to act rationPareto optimality.
I1. One of the significant transaction costs associated with the education of partici-

pants in bargaining often is the need for public disclosure of trade secrets. See McGarity &
Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming
Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HAv. L. REv. 837 (1980).
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ally on the basis of this knowledge. Psychological studies uniformly
demonstrate that individuals have a limited ability to make rational decisions concerning health and safety risks even when they
have full knowledge of the nature of those risks.12 Characteristics
of risks independent of their magnitude and nature can cause an
individual to react very differently to objectively comparable risks.
For example, the way in which a risk is communicated influences
how people react to it."' Thus, even though driving without
seatbelts is much riskier than swimming in salt water, most people
currently do not perceive and act upon the relative risks in a rational manner. If the box office smash of the 1970s had been called
Belts instead of Jaws most people would perceive a very different
relationship between these two risks. To a large extent, then, society shapes each individual's subjective perception of risks to create
an objectively irrational pattern of responses. This leads to a degree of circularity in the assumption that the market will induce
spending on safety at a level optimal to each individual. 4 The
market can accommodate a wide variety of tastes for risk and large
shifts in such tastes over time, but it does not function well when
tastes for risk violate the fundamental principle of transitivity.
The final flaw in the market is the fact that the outcome of
any market-based transaction depends heavily on the preexisting
distribution of wealth. This problem is present in all markets, but
when life itself is the commodity being exchanged, all societies
have rejected pure reliance on the market as a means of allocating
resources. Society will not allow a wealthy individual to "purchase"
the life of a poor individual even if both are "voluntary" participants in the transaction.
12. Slovic, Judgment, Choice and Societal Risk Taking, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION IN
PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION 99-102 (K. Hammond ed. 1978); G. CALABREsI & P. BOBBITT,
supra note 1, at 116-17.
13. Slovic, supra note 12, at 100-01.
14. Changing legal rules to avoid problems created by the cognitive limits of individuals may be characterized accurately as paternalism. For those who find paternalistic criticisms and justifications for change unpalatable, I have two responses. First, factors independent of paternalism are sufficient to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the market for safety
and to justify changes in the legal framework within which that market functions. Second,
socialization of safety risks through insurance and social welfare programs has become so
widespread in the United States that paternalism may have to be considered a legitimate
justification for changing legal mechanisms. For instance, people whct foolishly refuse to
wear helmets when they ride motorcycles not only endanger themselves but also cause large
increases in the cost of motorcycle insurance and life insurance and an increase in the
amount of general revenue allocated to various social welfare programs.
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C. FutureEffectiveness of the Market
Several factors suggest that in the years to come the market
will become increasingly unacceptable as a means of allocating
safety resources. With respect to the critical externalities problem,
two phenomena are now evident. Activities that create externalities are becoming more prevalent, and societal awareness of the
externalities associated with traditional activities is increasing. 15
Many forces have converged to make the health and safety of each
individual member of society much more dependent upon the actions of third parties with whom no bargaining relationship exists.
Moreover, heretofore unknown external relationships are becoming
apparent-for example, a tall smokestack on a midwestern manufacturing plant affects the health of East Coast residents through
the phenomenon of acid rain.
Increased externalities inevitably mean increases in the transaction costs that would have to be incurred to permit the market
to accommodate each nontrivial interest affected by the transaction. Thus, the cost of identifying affected individuals grows and
with it, in geometric proportion to the number of individual participants, the cost of the actual bargaining process itself.
As contractual relationships grow increasingly complex, the
market will become increasingly hneffective as a mechanism for internalizing costs. The cognitive abilities of the bargaining parties
are simply too limited. For a market in safety to function effectively in modern society each individual worker and consumer
would have to master statistics, dose-response relationships, and
the etiology of a variety of diseases and learn to use that information rationally. Given the general inability of individuals to distinguish relatively simple safety risks rationally, it is totally unrealistic to assume a rational response pattern to the diverse, complex
activity/risk relationships that will confront each individual in the
future. Indeed, increased irrationality in individual confrontations
with risk can be expected as the complexity and diversity of risk
relationships increases.
There is yet another reason why the market is likely to be less
acceptable as a means of allocating safety in the future. It is possible that what has been perceived as an acceptable level and~distribution of safety attributable to market forces actually results from
other forces whose power is now waning. Historically, many deci15. See Rowe, GovernmentalRegulation of SocietalRisks, 45 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 944,
945 (1977).
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sions on health and safety were influenced as much by personal
moral, ethical, and religious values as by economic self-interest.
With the replacement over the last few decades of the small firm
employing local labor and serving a local market by the large firm
with multiple plants and regional or national markets, the influence of personal values in decisions concerning safety has declined.16 The modern professional manager makes decisions in an
institutional context that encourage depersonalization and economic rationality. Thus, ironically, externalization of the health
and safety costs of decisions is much more likely to produce an
allocation of safety resources that is irrational from a societal perspective today than it was in the society of thirty or forty years ago
when factors other than cost influenced private decisionmakers.
It might be argued that sensitivity to the public relations implications of private health and safety decisions mitigates the impact of cost factors. Public relations considerations, however, are
likely to exacerbate the tendency toward irrational spending patterns. The professional manager is likely to overspend on safety
issues that are highly visible and underspend on those that are not
likely to receive prominent attention from the media. Perhaps, for
some highly visible risks, the expense assumed because of public
relations factors may counteract both the decreased proportion of
accident costs that are internalized to the firm and the decreased
importance of moral and religious values; it would require a great
leap of faith, however, to assume that any sort of rough balance of
these factors will evolve for most health and safety decisions. Thus,
it is fair to infer that there is a large and growing range of activities in which the market alone cannot be relied upon to produce
adequate spending to reduce health and safety risks.

III.

TORT LAW AS AN AM TO THE: MARKET

Tort law attempts to serve three societal goals. It reduces individual hardship by providing compensation to the victims of some
accidents. It reduces the secondary costs of the accidents for which
it allows compensation by spreading the costs of such accidents
16. Some proof of this can be found in the data concerning injuries in the workplace.
Large employers have a greater economic incentive to create a safe workplace than small
employers because the insurance premiums paid by large employers are affected by their
accident rate while the premiums of small employers are not. Yet, small employers tend to

have lower accident rates than large employers. J. CHELIUS, WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEATH:
Tim ROLE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATON 26 (1977). Obviously, something independent of economic incentive must explain this result.
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over a larger group. Finally, it assists the market for safety by forcing internalization of some accident costs to entities that are assumed to have the ability to reduce those costs through greater
spending on safety. This analysis will focus exclusively on the
safety-enhancing goal of tort law, but the implications of the analysis are broad. If tort law does not serve the goal of encouraging
spending on safety, it may be that safety enhancement should be
abandoned as a goal of tort law. It is much easier to establish and
administer a mechanism designed to serve only the goals of compensation and secondary accident cost reduction than it is to attempt to pursue all three goals with the same legal mechanism.
Indeed, at least one nation generally comparable to the United
States in terms of social values and goals recently has made the
decision to abandon safety enhancement as a goal of tort law, and
17
other nations are considering similar steps.
A.

Advantages of Tort Law

At least in theory, tort law has all the advantages of the market as a means of encouraging spending on safety. Chief among
those advantages is, of course, accommodation of individual tastes
for safety risks, and the resulting freedom of each individual to
purchase that degree of safety that corresponds to his or her tastes.
Tort law, in addition, addresses the externalities problem by forcing individuals and firms with theoretical control over safety to internalize the costs of accidents.
Internalization of accident costs can enhance the operation of
the safety market in two related ways. First, forcing individuals
and firms with a measure of control over accident costs to absorb
those costs provides an incentive to reduce the accident rate, the
consequences of accidents, or both. If the costs of accidents are
calculated accurately, internalization of those costs to the entity
with control over accident costs should produce an optimal level of
spending to reduce accident costs. The entity bearing the costs of
accidents will have an incentive to keep spending to reduce those
costs up to the point at which marginal cost of accident cost avoidance equals marginal cost of accidents. Second, by forcing firms
whose products or services are responsible for accident costs to ab17. See Marks, A First in National No-Fault: The Accident Compensation Act of
1972 of New Zealand, 47 AusTL. L.J. 516 (1973); Vennel, The Scope of National No-Fault
Accident Compensation in Australia and New Zealand, 49 AusTL. L.J. 22 (1975); Report of
National Committee of Inquiry Into Compensation and Rehabilitation in Australia, 48
AUSTL. L.J. 413 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Report].
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sorb those costs, society forces the prices of goods and services to
reflect all costs required to make them available, including costs of
accidents. The higher price, in turn, reduces accident costs by inducing consumers to switch from goods and services with high accident costs to functional substitutes with lower accident costs. Failure to internalize all accident costs, then, amounts to a subsidy for
high accident cost goods and services, and an indirect subsidy for
accidents.
B. Limits of Tort Law
For tort law to assist the market for safety in the manner described, it must accomplish two critical subgoals. First, calculation
of the costs of accidents must be accurate. That is, the accident
costs internalized to activities must reflect a reasonable approximation of the value society places on avoiding various consequences of accidents.18 Second, tort law must internalize costs of
accidents to entities that are in a position to control those costs. In
the first step of this analysis, the second subgoal is assumed to be
achieved, or at least achievable. The focus of inquiry is thus entirely on the manner in which tort law calculates the costs of accidents. I will analyze the extent to which tort law actually accomplishes the second subgoal after discussing the manner in which
tort law calculates accident costs.
1. Calculating the Costs of Accidents
Rather than attempting an exhaustive survey of the law of
damages in tort, this analysis will be confined to an overview of the
manner in which tort law values human life-one of the more difficult accident cost valuation problems. Courts often disclaim any
attempt to place a value on human life when they determine dam18. If Pareto optimality were retained as the allocative goal of tort law, individual
valuations of accident consequences would have to be reflected in tort damage calculations.
However, placing individualized values on many accident consequences is analytically impossible for the reasons discussed in the text accompanying notes 90-100 infra. Moreover,
any attempt to place individualized values on accident consequences raises the transaction
costs of the valuation process, while simultaneously causing psychic injury to society by
creating valuations that vary with the distribution of wealth. Thus, the Pareto optimality
goal is compromised to the extent of substituting social values for individual values of accident consequences. Of course, measuring social values is also impossible analytically and
empirically. Therefore, the most practical surrogate for both individual value and social
value is some measure of average individual value derived from statistical analysis of individual conduct. See text accompanying notes 90-100 and note 100 infra.
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ages in wrongful death actions.19 In a functional sense, however,
courts must necessarily place an implicit value on life when they
determine such damages.2 0 If tort law assists the market for safety
in the manner hypothesized earlier, the level of damages assessed
for a particular consequence of accidents will determine the level
of spending to avoid that consequence. The courts are providing
price signals to firms positioned to avoid accident costs, indicating
that they should spend a particular amount of money to avoid a
particular consequence of accidents.
The law of damages for wrongful death is complex. It has as
many variations as there are jurisdictions whose laws govern it. For
purposes of this analysis, however, it is not necessary to pursue all
the subtleties of wrongful death law; it will suffice to develop an
overview of the major factors that determine the magnitude of a
wrongful death award and the general range of damages awarded
for broad categories of lives.
There are two approaches to calculating damages for wrongful
death-loss to survivors and loss to estate.2 ' The two approaches
differ to some extent in concept and in the factors considered in
determining damage awards. Many major elements of damages are
common to both approaches, however, and the amount of damages
awarded does not seem to vary greatly among jurisdictions depending upon the theory of valuation used.2
The loss-to-survivors approach has been adopted in a majority
of jurisdictions. In these states, the basic function of judge and
jury is to determine the amount of money (or equivalent goods and
services) that the victim would have provided to his dependents if
his life had not been prematurely terminated. The minority lossto-estate approach requires the judge and jury to determine the
19. E.g., Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 455-56, 459, 161 So. 85, 87-88
(1935).
20. Since wrongful death law has a statutory base, state legislatures actually play a
dominant role in determining the amount of damages recoverable for wrongful death. The
courts, however, must interpret and apply these statutes.
21. For an encyclopedic description of the basis for calculating wrongful death damages, see 1 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (2d ed. 1975). See also W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS 902-09 (4th ed. 1971).
22. There is a large variation among jurisdictions in the magnitude of wrongful death
awards, but the variation does not correlate well with the theory of valuation used in each
jurisdiction. See Million DollarJury Awards, National Law Journal, June 18, 1979, at 1, 1213. See also Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The Death of Children:A NonparametricStatistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 884 (1974); INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT 11-57 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FINAL
REPORT].
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amount of money the victim would have earned and left in an estate if his life had not been prematurely terminated. For purposes
of this analysis, the characteristics shared by the two approaches
are far more important than their distinguishing features.
In most wrongful death actions in which the victim is an adult,
the largest element of damages by far is the present value of the
future net earnings of the victim.23 Depending upon the jurisdiction, those earnings are included to the extent they would have
contributed to the support of the victim's dependents or would
have been passed on to the victim's heirs. 4 By either measure, this
makes certain characteristics of the victim extremely important in
calculating the cost of premature loss of life.
For people who have already begun a career, the measure of
damages is related to age. Other things being equal, a younger victim will have a future earnings stream greater than an older victim,
and thus a larger damage award. This valuation may be consistent
with prevailing social values. The amount of damages also relates
to the future earning power of the victim, with the result that the
life of a salaried executive is valued more highly than that of a
factory worker. It is at best questionable whether this distinction is
consistent with prevailing social values. One must wonder whether
society really wants to place no value on the life of a person who
has no future earning power or to spend five or ten times as much
to protect the lives of highly paid executives as is spent to protect
the lives of laborers. Of course, the origin and persistence of this
distinction as a basis for valuing life in the tort law context is almost certainly attributable to its consistency with the compensation goal.
Another factor that can greatly influence the valuation of life
in the tort system is the existence and characteristics of the dependents of the victim. In most jurisdictions, there are no damages if
there are no dependents, and the future earnings component of
damages stops accruing whenever, as in the case of a dependent
minor child, the cessation of dependency status can be predicted at
some future time.2 5 Again, the goal of compensation provides a rationale for tying the value of life to the existence and status of the
23. The standard method of calculating loss of future earnings is set forth in Curtis &
Wilson, DeterminingLoss of Earningsfrom Impairment or Death, 37 ALA. LAW. 221 (1976);
Curtis & Wilson, A Model to Project Loss of Earningsfrom Impaired or Destroyed Capacity, 6 ATL. ECON. J. 41 (July 1978).
24. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 21, at 116-17, 217-19.
25. Id. at 217-19.
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victim's dependents. Viewing tort law as a means of encouraging
spending on safety, however, the relationship between the existence of dependents and the implicit valuation of life in tort law
does not seem to reflect society's values. Surely society does not
want to provide a price signal indicating that the life of a person
with no dependents has no value.
Traditionally, so-called "nonmonetary" factors were not considered in calculating damages for wrongful death. In recent years,
a distinct trend toward recognition of nonmonetary factors, such as
loss of companionship and even mental anguish, has emerged." In
the bulk of modern cases involving wrongful death of adult wage
earners, however, the present value of expected future support to
surviving dependents continues to be the major component of
damages, and the amount awarded for nonmonetary factors remains modest in all but a few highly publicized cases.
Some of the irrationalities inherent in tort calculations emerge
from an analysis of the manner in which damages are determined,
but the true anomalies become starkly apparent when the results
of that process are analyzed. Consider the wrongful death of a
child. While the adult wage earner's life is assigned a relatively
high value in most cases, the life of a child is given little value in
tort law. The general approach to determining damages for wrongful death should actually yield a negative value for the life of a
child, but judges and juries usually "cheat" in this area and find
some basis to assign a positive value to the life of a child.2 7 Still,
the results of the process imply a very low value for the life of a
child. The average award for wrongful death of a child was determined in a recent study to be $28,355.28 Thus, the signal given a
firm is that it should spend up to, but no more than, $28,355 on
safety per child's life saved by its expenditures. It is inconceivable
that society actually desires to establish a market in safety that
assigns such an absurdly low value to the life of a child. This valuation also is absurd relative to other implicit valuations in tort law.
Indeed, the average damage award in a personal injury case is
$181,401,1" and the average damage award for wrongful death of an
adult male is $240,228.0 It is unlikely that society really wants to
26. Id. at 308-22.
27.

Id. at 509-19; W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 909; Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser,

supra note 22, at 890.
28. Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, supra note 22, at 887.
29. FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 11-56.
30. Million Dollar Jury Awards, supra note 22, at 1, 12-13.
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encourage firms to spend six times as much to avoid personal injury to an adult and ten times as much to avoid the death of an
adult male as it spends to avoid the death of a child. Nevertheless,
by merging the compensation decision with the liability decision,
and then selecting compensation as the more important goal, the
tort system has precisely this effect.
The argument might be made that the anomalous relative values placed on life versus serious injury, fife of a child versus life of
an adult wage earner, etc. are of no great importance in determining whether tort law creates a rational and effective market for
safety because firms have very limited ability to make decisions on
safety that reflect fine distinctions among the potential consequences of accidents. In other words, it is practically impossible for
a firm to take measures that avoid serious injury or death to wage
earners without also protecting children. If this view is correct, it
follows that irrational differences in the valuation of particular
consequences of accidents do not create functional aberrations in
the market for safety as long as the aggregate valuation of the consequences of accidents is rational.
There are two reasons why this defense of current tort law
cannot be accepted. First, there are many circumstances in which
firms can determine their optimum level of spending on safety
based upon the specific type of individual whose safety is at stake.
or the particular type of injury affected by a safety decision. A
clear example is the manufacture of children's clothing. The rational children's clothing manufacturer can ignore the tort law signals concerning the relatively high value attached to serious injuries or death of an adult wage earner and base its decisions on
expenditures for features such as resistance to fire entirely upon
the $28,355 value tort law places on the life of a child. Firms often
can choose as well between risks of injury and risks of death. For
instance, a toy manufacturer might spend money to redesign a toy
so that its edges cannot cut a child, but decline to analyze the toxicity of a toy part that is small enough to ingest. The tort system's
relative valuations of injury versus loss of life of a child make this
decision rational. Indeed, there are many broad areas in which tort
law's bizarre relative valuations of accident costs have a material
effect upon safety spending decisions. For instance, manufacturers
of airplanes, intercity buses, and school buses confront very different tort-derived incentives to spend on safety because of the wide
disparities in the average earning capacities and dependency status
of their respective passengers.
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The second reason for rejecting the defense of tort law's methods of valuing accidents is even more fundamental. There is a consistent downward bias in tort law valuations of important consequences of accidents, such as loss of life. By failing to include as
elements of damages such very real costs as the grief of relatives
and friends, tort law understates accident costs and thereby creates insufficient incentives for safety.3 1
2.

Internalizing Costs in Tort Law

In order to provide an effective market for safety, tort law
must both calculate accident costs and internalize those costs to
individuals and entities that can control the magnitude of accident
costs either by avoiding accidents altogether or by reducing their
consequences. The preceding discussion focused solely on the
quantification process. The next step in evaluating the effectiveness of tort law is to analyze the actual cost internalization process.
Theoretically, tort law forces internalization of all accident costs
considered in the damage calculation process to individuals or entities who, by virtue of a judicial finding of "fault," are believed to
be in a position to control accident costs. Empirical evidence demonstrates conclusively that the actual internalization process differs dramatically from theory.
There are many ways in which tort law either fails to internalize accident costs in the first instance or permits those costs to be
reexternalized. A major source of tort law's failure to internalize
accident costs is simply the victim's failure to make a claim for
compensation. In most cases, in which the victim bears the accident costs, the victim externalizes those costs through social welfare programs and first party insurance. The possible explanations
for the failure to make claims include the difficulty of proving
fault, the difficulty of proving causation, the high transaction costs
of the tort system, availability of compensation from other sources
(first party insurance, social welfare programs, etc.), potential inability to collect from a judgment-proof defendant, the belief that
it is wrong to sue someone unless they have done something "bad,"
and ignorance of the fact that the victim's injury was caused by
some other party or that compensation is available from that
party. Many of these factors will be discussed in subsequent sections of this Article. I know of no way to isolate the effect of each,
but several studies demonstrate that their combined effect is to
31. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL

STUD.

29, 47 (1972).

1296

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:1281

undermine significantly the tort system's cost internalization
function.
Only a small fraction of personal injuries arising from various
causes actually yield a claim for compensation. Ten percent of
product-related injuries give rise to claims for compensation.32 The
analogous figure for injuries to patients resulting from the therapeutic process is one percent," and, when the tort system was still
functioning in the employment context, between six and thirty
percent of employment-related injuries resulted in claims for compensation.3 4 These figures may tend to overstate the extent of externalization of accident costs attributable to victim failure to file a
claim, since high cost accidents are more likely to result in a claim
for compensation than low cost accidents. It is apparent, however,
that failure to file a claim is a major source of externalization of
accident costs in the tort system.
Costs are further externalized by the tendency of many victims to settle for compensation well below the actual costs of an
accident.3 5 This pattern results from a combination of factors, including the victim's desperate and immediate need for money, the
uncertainty of success in 'pursuing a tort remedy, the cost of
processing a tort claim, and, above all, the amount of time required
to obtain any compensation through judicial resolution of a contested claim. The victim (or the victim's survivor) often has little
choice but to be content with a combination of benefits from external sources, such as social welfare and first party insurance, supplemented by a few thousand dollars in settlement of a disputed
tort claim.
Another major source of cost externalization is the difficulty of
proving fault. Although tort law has undergone a number of
changes in recent decades designed to ease the burden of proving
fault, the tort system nevertheless remains based almost exclusively upon fault in some form.3" The magnitude of externalization
32.

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 22, at VII-212 to -13.

33. Bernzweig, Some Comparisons Between the Medical Malpractice and Products
Liability Problems in INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILrry: SFLECTED PAPERS

430-31 (1976) [hereinafter cited as

SELECTED PAPERS].

34. J. CHELIUS, supra note 16, at 19.
35. Id. at 61.
36. The so-called strict liability in tort adopted for product-related injuries is merely a
fault-based system in which the method of determining fault differs from that employed in
traditional negligence actions. See Westerbeke & Meltzer, Comparative Fault and Strict
Products Liability in Kansas: Reflections on the DistinctionBetween Initial Liability and
Ultimate Loss Allocation, 28 KAN. L. REV. 25 (1979). See also FINAL REPORT, supra note 22,
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attributable directly to the difficulty of proving fault can in part be
seen by comparing the number of particular accidents found by an
objective research study to be caused by third party violation of a
safety rule with the number of similar accidents in which costs
were actually shifted to a third party based upon a finding of fault.
Comparative data suggest that fault is actually proven in only
37
about ten percent of incidents involving the fault of third parties.
Persuasive anecdotal evidence that the difficulty of proving
fault externalizes a high percentage of accident costs is available in
the literature on the tort litigation concerning the prescription
drug MER/29.3 Over 5000 people suffered serious injury, including
blindness, from using MER/29. Approximately 1500 victims filed
tort claims against the manufacturer. The principal factual issue
contested in the litigated cases was whether the manufacturer either negligently or intentionally failed to notify consumers and the
Food and Drug Administration of test results that the manufacturer knew, or should have known, indicated the potential for serious adverse side effects. Most of the cases were settled based on
the results of a few reported cases. In a majority of the reported
cases, the manufacturer escaped liability based upon findings either that the drug raised no risks or that the manufacturer had no
reason to know of such risks.39 Yet, subsequent studies and litigation established beyond doubt the knowledge and fault of the manufacturer. In one of the later reported civil cases, the manufacturer
was found to have directed its employees in knowingly, maliciously, and recklessly failing to disclose serious risks.4 0 In addition, the company and several of its employees ultimately were indicted and pleaded nolo contendere to criminal charges of
submitting false data to, and withholding data from, the Food and
at III-10.
37.

R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND

HEALTH ACT 66-67 (1976). Data on acci-

dent cause produced by objective investigation are far more likely to reflect actual fact than
the results of fault-based tort litigation. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 259-60.
38. For descriptions of the MER/29 incident and resulting litigation, see M. MINTZ, By
PRESCRIPTION ONLY 230-47d (2d ed. 1967); Merrill, Compensationfor PrescriptionDrug Injuries, 59 VA. L. RE V. 1, 22-23, 40-43 (1973); Rheingold, The MER129 Story-An Instance
of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 116, 117-21 (1968).
39. See, e.g., Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 316, 413 P.2d 400 (1966), overruled on other
grounds, McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 398, 528 P.2d 522, 534
(1974); Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967). See also Merrill, supra note 38, at 41.
40. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
See also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
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Drug Administration. 4 '
The difficulty of proving causation is another major reason
that accident costs tend to be externalized. Indeed, causation
problems have led to an almost complete breakdown in the tort
system as a mechanism for internalizing accident costs in several
important areas. Diseases caused in part by the toxic properties of
chemicals contained in products or in the workplace rarely form
the basis for successful tort claims. The judicial system cannot
contend with causation problems in the context of consequences
that have long developmental periods and whose etiology suggests
the likelihood of joint causation.4 2 More generally, the tort system
has extreme difficulty coping with statistical indications of causation. There are many circumstances in which a rational decisionmaker can go no farther than to conclude, for example, that forty
percent of accidents of the type at issue are caused by one factor
and forty percent by another.48 In this large class of accidents, the
judicial system typically externalizes accident costs by refusing recovery to the victim who, in turn, externalizes the bulk of the costs
through first party insurance or social welfare programs.
Of those accident costs internalized initially through the tort
system, the vast majority are reexternalized through liability insurance. In theory, liability insurance assists tort law in achieving its
secondary loss minimization goal, while compromising only slightly
the safety enhancement goal. As long as the cost of insurance is
spread in proportion to the varying risks created by particular activities and firms, the availability of liability insurance should not
frustrate the goal of encouraging safety. The problem in practice is
that insurance costs reflect only crudely, if at all, variations in risks
of accidents among firms and activities.
The recent interagency study of product liability insurance
provides extensive data demonstrating the high degree of accident
cost externalization produced by liability insurance. Only a small
fraction of product liability insurance is made available at a premium calculated on the basis of the risks associated with the particular insured. Indeed, a substantial portion of liability insur41. See M. MINTZ, supra note 38, at 243; Merrill, supra note 38, at 23.
42. See J. CHELIUS, supra note 16, at 22-23; FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, at VII-221
to -22; R. SMITH, supra note 37, at 83.
43. E.g., Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161, 41 Cal. Rptr.
577 (1964).
44. Only very large companies are able to purchase insurance at premiums that are
"loss-rated," that is, determined with specific reference to the risks associated with the par-
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ance is made available only through comprehensive all-risk policies
that provide no basis for determining the premium associated with
various risks.45 Although most insurance companies maintain that
premiums reflect differences in the risks of accidents, 46 most firms
that purchase liability insurance believe there is no relationship
between the reduction of product-related accident risks and the liability insurance premium they must incur.47 Moreover, studies
have been unable to detect a correlation between accident cost
avoidance measures and liability insurance premiums except in the
case of very large firms and a few common products.4 8 Thus, when
the liability insurance mechanism is added to the tort system, tort
liability appears in most instances to internalize costs to such a
large group (all purchasers of products liability insurance or, in
some cases, all members of a large industry) that the effect is reexternalization. As a result, the incentive for safety theoretically created by the tort system is all but eliminated.
The explanation for the high degree of cost reexternalization
lies in the actuarial techniques necessary to relate insurance premium costs to accident costs. "Loss-rating" an insurance policy requires considerable historical data on the cost of claims arising
from a particular firm or activity. 49 The tort system produces accident cost data very slowly because of the low claim rate relative to
the accident rate and the slow progress of tort litigation through
the judicial system. Moreover, historical data on accident costs as
measured by the tort system are poor predicters of the future accident costs of a firm or activity. The rules for determining liability
and damages in fields such as product liability law are so complex,
and the results of litigation so unpredictable, that litigation results
are actuarially useless until a great many cases have been concluded. In terms of both liability and, perhaps even more importantly, the magnitude of the award, actuaries perceive so little relaticular firm. FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, at V-12. Approximately another ten percent of
product liability insurance coverage is available at premiums calculated with reference to
specific product lines. This tends to be available only for a limited number of common, lowrisk products. Id. at V-10, -11. The basis for calculating the premiums for most product
liability coverage is obscure and appears to bear only a remote relationship to specific risks.
Id. at V-9 to -12.
45. Id. at V-11.
46. Id. at VII-177 to -78.
47. Id. at IV-12, VI-52.
48. Id. at VH-177.
49. Id. at V-48 to -49. See also Clements, Commentary on the Insurance Considerations in the Federal Interagency Task Force Report on Product Liability, in SELECTED PAPERS,

supra note 33, at 61-62.
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tionship between the results of past tort litigation and factors that
can form the basis for predictions concerning future awards that
an enormous amount of historical data is required to loss-rate a
policy.50 Yet the paucity of claims and the slow pace of tort litigation retard development of an adequate data base. As a result,
loss-rating is possible for only very large companies or for broad
activities, such as an entire manufacturing industry.
Many aspects of the tort system thus combine to externalize
accident costs: inadequate valuation of the consequences of many
accidents, failure to make a claim, inability to prove fault, inability
to prove cause, and liability insurance. When the interrelationships
of these powerful externalizing forces are considered, it becomes
clear that tort law actually serves the goal of creating a market for
safety very poorly indeed. For a system whose transaction costs are
approximately equal to the total amount of compensation provided,51 tort law must be considered an extraordinarily inefficient
and ineffective method by which to obtain a rational level and pattern of spending on safety.
C.

Future Effectiveness of Tort Law

It is difficult to be sanguine about the future of tort law as an
efficient and effective means of encouraging safety. Indeed, there
are good reasons to expect that its current appalling inefficiency
and ineffectiveness will become more pronounced over time. Tort
law is becoming vastly more complicated with the emergence of
comparative negligence. This increased complexity will have two
effects. It will increase the transaction costs of the tort system, and
it will confound the actuarial process by introducing additional
sources of predictive uncertainty. The first will reduce the efficiency of the system, while the second will increase the degree of
reexternalization through liability insurance. New social welfare
programs now under serious consideration, such as national health
insurance, will externalize an even greater proportion of accident
costs, thus further reducing the effectiveness of tort law as a means
of encouraging safety.
D.

The Utility of Incremental Changes in Tort Law

Most changes in tort law now under consideration, such as
changes in statutes of limitations or tinkering with rules of liability
50.
51.

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, at VII-16 to -20, -64 to -65.
Id. at V-25.
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or damages,5 - would have virtually no effect on the problem of inadequate safety incentives. Minor palliatives cannot touch the endemic inadequacies in the tort system. It is possible to conceive,
however, of more drastic changes in tort law that, at least in theory, could improve its effectiveness while retaining the present institutional structure. For example, liability insurance could be severely limited or abolished, the basis for recovery could be
broadened substantially to approximate a no-fault methodology,
and damages could be calculated so that the consequences of accidents are translated into costs that reflect more accurately societal
values. In theory, this combination of changes would eliminate the
defects in the tort system that cause it to be ineffective as a mechanism for encouraging safety. Unfortunately, there are many reasons to believe that such a total revamping of tort law would fall
far short of its theoretical promise, and that further, it would create a whole new set of collateral problems.
One reason that such dramatic changes might not succeed is
that individual decisionmakers tend to emphasize the short-term
consequences of their decisions and to deemphasize the long-term
consequences, a phenomenon known as the "Faust effect." The existence of this "effect" has long been recognized by students of accident law.53 It explains the tendency of individuals to discount at
an irrational level many safety risks whose consequences are not
likely to be manifested until some time after exposure to the risk.
There is growing evidence that firms are also materially affected by
this tendency. As the cost of product liability insurance has increased in recent years, many firms have "gone bare"-that is,
they have simply stopped insuring."' Thus, rather than responding
to increased accident costs by attempting to reduce those costs, as
tort theory anticipates, these firms have chosen to avoid all current
costs of accidents and to expose themselves to staggering potential
future costs. The data also suggest an explanation for this phenomenon. The "going bare" syndrome is widespread among, and limited to, small and medium-sized firms.5 5 Many of these firms could
not possibly cover a major damage award or a cluster of large
52.

See, e.g., Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 2995 (1979).
CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 57.
54. FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, at M-2, -17. See also Letter from Ralph B. Baldwin,
Pres., Oliver Machinery Co. to Edward Barrett, II, Project Director, Interagency Task Force
on Product Liability, SELCrED PAPmEs, supra note 33, at 43.

53. See G.

55.

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 22, at IH-17.
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awards resulting from a particular activity or product.5 6 Given the
mortality rate for such firms and the protection of personal assets
of firm owners afforded by the corporate form and bankruptcy
laws, it may be perfectly rational for them to ignore the potential
future costs of accidents. In any event, a large proportion of small
and medium-sized firms play the role of Faust to the extent that
they will not respond to speculative future tort liability by making
large current expenditures on accident cost avoidance. Indeed, the
same study that showed a high percentage of small and mediumsized firms "going bare" found that, although insurance costs and
tort awards are increasing, very few small and medium-sized firms
57
have taken measures to increase the safety of their products.
The limited cognitive ability of decisionmakers within firms
also suggests that the potential advantages of revamping tort law
would not be fully realized. For increased exposure to potential
tort liability to produce a corresponding increase in accident cost
avoidance expenditures, it is necessary to assume that individual
firms have sufficient knowledge of the hazardous characteristics of
their products and activities to be aware of the risks they are incurring and to act accordingly. Again, particularly for small and
medium-sized firms, this assumption is not valid. For instance, a
small chemical firm has only limited toxicological expertise. If the
firm cannot predict future costs, it surely cannot be expected to
take measures to avoid or reduce those costs.
Finally, causation problems will continue to undermine the
practical advantages of tort law revision. Even if "fault" is eliminated as a criterion, the courts would still face the difficult task of
determining causation in each case. This creates two significant
problems. First, individualized determinations of causation would
continue to produce high transaction costs, high uncertainty in
predicting future tort costs, and delay in handling claims. Each of
these would impair the efficiency and effectiveness of the revised
tort system. Second, decentralized individual determinations of
cause would not internalize accident costs to the entity with the
greatest ability to control accident costs. Professor Calabresi has
demonstrated persuasively that there is a poor correlation between
judicial determinations of fault and identification of parties in the
best position to control the costs of accidents. 58 This poor correla56. Id. at VI-34; Remarks by Professor Douglas Olson, U.S. Dept. of Commerce Symposium on Products Liability (July 21, 1976), SELECTED PAPERS, supra note 33, at 210-11.
57. FiNAL REPoRT, supra note 22, at IV-4.
58. G. CALAa si, supra note 4, at 244-65.
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tion is attributable to three factors. First, many parties who are
found to be at fault lack the information or cognitive capabilities
to predict accident costs. Therefore, they cannot control future accident costs. 9 Second, the fault that is often the basis for determining liability is simply an instance of routine individual carelessness or inattention, the occurrence and frequency of which cannot
be affected by expectations of liability.6 0 Third, tort litigation frequently does not even bring before the court the party who is in
the best position to control the costs of accidents." This third factor obviously is equally true of causation, and there are reasons
analogous to the first and second factors that suggest a low correlation between judicial determinations of causation and identification of the entity best positioned to control the costs of various
types of accidents.6 2 Moreover, decentralized individual determinations of cause still could not cope with the recurring problem of
statistical cause and joint cause alluded to earlier.
Even if modifying tort law would not produce a truly effective
59. Id. at 245.
60. Id. at 256. See also 86 HARv. L. REv. 923, 930-31 (1973).
61. G. CALABRESi, supra note 4, at 256.
62. Consider, for example, the manner in which costs might be allocated for typical
motorcycle accidents. The largest class of motorcycle accidents result from failure of the
operator of an automobile to yield the right-of-way to a motorcycle. The fault-based system
assigns the costs of these accidents to individual automobile operators who, in turn, externalize them to all automobile operators through liability insurance. Even without externalization through insurance, placing the costs of these accidents on the automobile operators
involved is unlikely to have any effect on the incidence of such accidents. In-depth studies
of the automobile operators involved in such accidents demonstrate that they simply do not
see the motorcycle. See They Have Eyes To See, CYCLE WORLD, Oct. 1979, at 21. Obviously,
no deterrent can be effective in encouraging automobile operators to yield the right-of-way
to something they do not see. Instructing the court to ignore fault and to focus on causation
in its classic sense would not be likely to improve the results. The court probably still would
find that the automobile operator's conduct "caused" the accident. Even if the court found
that the motorcycle operator's conduct "caused" the accident, allocating costs of such accidents to motorcyclists would be unlikely to reduce the incidence or costs of such accidents.
The motorcyclist will not modify his conduct to avoid accidents of this type for several
reasons. First, he can externalize most of the costs of accidents through a combination of
insurance and social welfare benefits. Second, and more fundamentally, the motorcyclist is
unlikely to be aware that lack of visibility of motorcycles to automobile operators creates a
large risk of accidents. Centralized identification of the "cause" in the broader sense of accidents of this type, as proposed in the text accompanying note 131 infra, would result in
allocation of all motorcycle accident costs attributable to lack of visibility of motorcycles to
motorcycle manufacturers, with significant differences in the incidence of involvement of a
particular manufacturer's product reflected in proportionate changes in the accident costs
assigned to that manufacturer. Such an allocation of accident costs would produce a meaningful reduction in the costs of motorcycle accidents with relatively modest additional
spending on accident cost avoidance, since it would motivate manufacturers to seek ways to
enhance motorcycle visibility (for example, by changes in paint, lighting, etc.).
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market for safety, the changes suggested might produce enough
improvement to make them worth undertaking were it not for a
number of collateral problems that could also be expected to result
from such a revamping of tort law. Taking the most obvious disadvantage first, prohibition of or stringent restrictions on liability
insurance would substantially sacrifice the tort law goal of reducing
the secondary costs of accidents. Very high dislocation costs could
attend the elimination of liability insurance as a cost-spreading device. Yet, the reexternalization effect of insurance is one of the
main evils of the present system that the proposed changes are
designed to correct.
The other potential disadvantages of tort law revision are less
obvious but, in a sense, are more fundamental. Because many
products and activities that are dangerous are also beneficial, there
is a distinct possibility that forcing complete internalization of accident costs to those entities that can best control accident costs
would not produce optimum allocation of resources in important
segments of the economy. 3 Consider, for example, a hypothetical
prescription drug. Assume the drug is only used to treat a serious
condition that is impervious to any other form of treatment. The
drug is effective for some people, but it has fatal side effects for
others. The net effect of the drug is to save the lives of three people for every one it takes. Assume also that the modified tort system values each life at $500,000. Under the modified tort system,
the manufacturer of the drug almost certainly would be identified
as the party with the best opportunity to control the costs of accidents associated with the drug, so the costs of the loss of life associated with the drug would be internalized to the manufacturer. In
theory, this internalization should produce an optimal allocation of
resources, but in practice the effect probably would be to force off
the market a drug that saves three lives for every one it takes-a
result that would be hard to defend under any concept of optimal
resource allocation.
With full internalization of the accident costs of the drug, the
cost of the drug would be approximately $166,667 for each patient." At this price, very few individuals could afford to purchase
the drug. Even though society has chosen to value each life af63.

Professor Posner has argued that transition to strict liability would frustrate

achievement of the allocative efficiency goals of tort law in other respects as well. Posner,
Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973).
64. I am assuming that the costs of manufacturing the drug are negligible compared
with the accident costs the manufacturer is required to bear.
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fected by the drug at $500,000, it is unlikely that any potential
lender would place even one-third that value on most individuals'
future income stream as collateral. Because the manufacturer is
unable to internalize the beneficial externalities associated with
the drug and is forced by the tort system to internalize its accident
costs, society's resources are seriously misallocated. This misallocation could only be avoided either by forcing internalization of a
lower proportion of accident costs or by providing a subsidy to account for the drug's beneficial externalities.
Even the present system, with its only partial cost internalization, may result in a serious misallocation of resources when the
activity in question produces substantial beneficial externalities.
One manifestation of this phenomenon is the extraordinarily high
cost of malpractice insurance for surgeons and anesthesiologists
that has temporarily jeopardized the continued availability of surgery in some jurisdictions. Many more misallocations could be expected if tort law were reformed in a manner that forced greater
internalization of accident costs, since there are beneficial external0 5
ities associated with most activities.
At present, tort law attempts, through its rules for determining fault, to avoid misallocation of resources that results from the
combination of full internalization of accident costs and large beneficial externalities. Judge Hand's formula for determining whether
conduct is negligents6 and the Comment k exception to product
liability67 should produce a finding of no liability, and hence, no
internalization of accident costs in circumstances when existence of
large beneficial externalities makes full internalization of accident
costs undesirable. Here again, however, theory and fact diverge.
Even assuming that the legal rules for liability focused the attention of the decisionmakers on the right question, 8 it is unlikely
65. See Bowman, The New Haven: A Passenger Railroad for Nonriders, 9 J.L. &
EcoN. 49, 50 (1966).
66. "[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P .
" United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1967).
67. "There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are
quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs.... Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965) (emphasis in original).
68. Judge Hand's formula requires simply a cost-benefit analysis. Thus, it does ask the
right question: whether total societal costs associated with a safety precaution are greater or
less than total societal benefits. Unfortunately, in practice courts tend to focus only on the
immediate burdens of safety precautions on the parties before the court and to ignore
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that individual judges and juries could determine whether a product or service creates substantial beneficial externalities. Moreover,
decentralized decisionmaking cannot deal with the common situation in which the existence of beneficial externalities requires a reduction of the amount of accident costs that are internalized to an
activity, rather than complete avoidance of accident cost internalization. In any event, elimination of fault as a criterion for tort
compensation would require creation of some new means of dealing
with this potentially significant problem.
Another related reason for skepticism as to the desirability of
modifying tort law to obtain full internalization of accident costs
lies in the potential foreign trade effects of such a change. It is, of
course, axiomatic in comparative advantage theory that all nations
benefit from free international trade. Significant differences among
nations in the degree of internalization of the costs of products,
however, can distort the operation of comparative advantage theory. If the United States forces internalization of a much higher
percentage of accident costs associated with its products than do
other countries, United States exports may decrease while its imports increase even for products in which the United States has an
initial comparative cost advantage. 9 With a system that produces
full internalization of accident costs, this distortive effect on foreign trade could become substantial. Even with the partial internalization of the current tort system, product liability insurance
rates of fifteen percent of total manufacturing costs have been reported for some products.70
In summary, it is not clear that a major overhaul of tort liability and damage rules would create a more effective market for
safety. In fact, as long as the present institutional structure of tort
decisionmaking is retained, it is likely that such a revision would
fall well short of its theoretically attainable goals and would cause
significant collateral problems. A major source of the inefficiency
and ineffectiveness of tort law-decentralized decisionmaking in
broader burdens on society. This has the same effect as ignoring beneficial externalities associated with activities. Comment k does not even ask the right question. It suggests no
need to inquire into the accident costs or the beneficial externalities associated with a product that is "unavoidably unsafe."
69. See generally I. WALTR, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION (1975).
70.

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 22, at VI-27.
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individual situations-would remain.
E.

DiscardingSafety Enhancement as a Goal of Tort Law

The limited effectiveness of tort law as a means of encouraging
safety has given rise to suggestions that this putative goal be abandoned entirely in favor of a system designed only to provide compensation and minimize the secondary costs of accidents. Such
suggestions have considerable appeal, largely because once reduction of primary accident costs is abandoned as a goal, it is relatively easy to devise a system that provides compensation and
minimizes secondary costs far more effectively and efficiently than
tort law.
New Zealand recently enacted legislation that abolishes all
personal injury actions and substitutes a system of administrative
compensation for all victims of accidents. Australia is seriously
considering a similar compensation scheme.7 1 Under these comprehensive no-fault systems, the victim is compensated in accordance
with predetermined schedules that include all medical costs, a percentage of lost earnings, a lifetime pension based on prior earnings
for permanently disabled victims or dependent survivors of victims
of fatal accidents, and modest lump sum payments for certain
types of injuries to compensate for noneconomic losses. 7 2 This approach to accident cost compensation was inspired by reports of
prestigious study commissions in both countries that reached the
following conclusions.73 First, tort law does not create incentives
for safety. Second, tort law does not provide a consistent and reliable source of compensation to accident victims. Third, in the majority of cases, tort law does not minimize secondary accident
costs, because it does not provide compensation. Fourth, the administrative costs of tort law are extraordinarily high.
The findings of the Australian and New Zealand Commissions
almost certainly are equally applicable to the United States tort
system, and indeed are corroborated by studies of less ambitious
scope conducted here. 4 Before embracing the Australian and New
Zealand approach, however, the implications of that approach for
71. See authorities cited in note 17 supra.
72. Marks, supra note 17, at 518-19.
73. Marks, supra note 17, at 516; Report, supra note 17, at 415; Vennel, supra note
17, at 23.
74.

E.g., U.S. DEPT OF TRANSP., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY

(1970); See also A Social InsuranceScheme for Automobile Accident Compensation, 57 VA.
L. REv. 409 (1971).
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determining the level of spending on safety should be recognized.
The funds from which accident costs are compensated by the Australian and New Zealand Boards are obtained from generalized
fixed-rate taxes on owners of motor vehicles and on employers. 5
Thus, under these compensation systems, all accident costs, except
those borne by the victim, are completely externalized. As a result,
the Australian/New Zealand approach removes all general incentives toward safety. At least United States tort law crudely and
inefficiently provides some general incentives toward safety by encouraging large companies with loss-rated liability policies to reduce their accident costs, 6 and by encouraging consumers to
switch from some goods and services77 with high accident costs to
substitutes with lower accident costs.
The Australian/New Zealand approach leaves society with direct regulation as its only means of encouraging safety. As I will
detail in the next section of this Article, there are many significant
problems with attempting to use direct regulation to encourage
safety. It is highly unlikely that direct regulation alone can effectively produce a rational level and pattern of spending on safety.
Moreover, direct regulation would create significant monetary and
nonmonetary costs. It is far preferable to devise a more efficient
and effective method of internalizing accident costs, if that is at all
possible. The task of devising a viable alternative to tort law as a
method of creating a market for safety must be reserved, however,
until after direct regulation has been evaluated as an alternative
means of encouraging safety.
IV.

DIRECT REGULATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR, OR A SUPPLEMENT
TO, THE MARKET AND TORT LAW

A.

Advantages of Direct Regulation

Direct regulation is usually justified on the theory that, in
some areas at least, the combination of the market and tort law
has proven ineffective as a mechanism for encouraging safety.
75.

Marks, supra note 17, at 517.

76. "[T]he tort-litigation system and increased product liability insurance premiums
have caused a number of manufacturers and insurers to devote more time and resources to
product liability prevention.... [Tihe data show that a much higher percentage of large
companies have implemented formal product liability loss prevention programs than small

firms." FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, at VI-47 to -48. See also id. at IV-12, -18 to -20.
77. The insurance premiums for some product lines are determined based upon the
risks associated with those products. In such cases, it is fair to infer that some variations in
accident costs are reflected in the sales price of products. Id. at VI-15 to -18.

ENCOURAGING SAFETY

1980]

1309

Thus, it is the failure of other parts of the legal system to internalize accident costs that forces reliance upon direct safety regulation.
Once the inadequacies of the operation of the market and tort law
are recognized in a particular context, direct regulation appears to
be the only available option for reducing accident costs. As demonstrated in the prior parts of this Article, the market and tort law
are increasingly less effective (and more costly). Hence, the growth
of direct regulation and its rapid spread to new areas is both understandable and seemingly justified.
The theory underlying direct regulation is relatively simple; if
an activity is producing too many accident costs, prohibit the activity or require that it be carried on in a different manner. There
is no reason in theory why direct regulation cannot produce an optimal level and pattern of spending on safety.7 8 As with the market
and tort law, however, direct regulation in practice falls well short
of its theoretically attainable goals.
B. Limits of Direct Regulation
1.

Setting Appropriate Standards

A major problem inherent in direct regulation is the difficulty
of determining which safety standards or rules will produce the optimum level of spending on safety. The current debate focuses on
the extent to which explicit quantification and comparison of the
costs and benefits of various standards should be relied upon in
lieu of purely subjective balancing of safety against costs. If costbenefit analysis (CBA) can be applied to the process of establishing safety standards with acceptable results, direct regulation provides a promising alternative means of encouraging safety. Thus,
to evaluate the efficacy of safety regulation, it is first necessary to
explore the major impediments to the use of CBA as a means of
determining optimal safety standards.
Determining causal relationships is, of course, indispensable to
calculating the benefits of a proposed safety standard. Yet, this de78. Here I do not use optimal in the Pareto optimality sense. Since direct regulation
necessarily reflects some measure of average taste and risk preference or aversion, it cannot
produce Pareto optimality. Thus, I use optimal in the more limited sense of creating a situation in which the marginal cost of expenditures on safety and the marginal cost of accidents
is approximately equal for each activity, with the measure of costs based upon some approximation of average individual values and preferences for risk. As Professor Calabresi has
demonstrated, Pareto optimality is not a useful criterion for assessing any method of achieving safety because neither the market nor direct regulation can achieve Pareto optimality.
G. CALABREsi & P. BoBnrrr, supra note 1, at 83-87.
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termination is often difficult, and the result is invariably imprecise.
Carcinogenicity determinations provide a particularly apt illustration of the problem. With respect to most suspected carcinogens, it
is impossible even to be certain that the agent causes cancer in
humans, though animal test results provide reasonably reliable indications. 79 Determining with a high degree of confidence the number of cases of cancer that the particular agent will cause at particular exposure levels is beyond the state of the art.80 The doseresponse relationship for carcinogens has been hypothesized to
possess several different, and inconsistent, characteristics,"' and it
is impossible at present to determine the accuracy of the relationships hypothesized.8 2 Indeed, the dose-response curve probably differs significantly among various carcinogens.8 3 Moreover, little is
known about the synergistic effects of carcinogens that could cause
the dose-response curve to differ from one population to another
depending upon degree of exposure to other carcinogens or to noncarcinogens that may accelerate the spread of cancer.84 In determining carcinogenicity, as in many other areas of accident causation, the state of the art and data availability limit regulators to a
crude approximation of causal relationships.
It must be recognized, however, that regulatory agencies are
probably institutionally better suited to determine causation than
are courts. The regulatory agency can deal with statistical and
probabilistic causation with all the data gathering and calculational advantages of a centralized decisionmaker. By contrast,
courts have great difficulty dealing with probabilistic and joint
causation, have limited access to relevant data, and have virtually
no ability to make sophisticated calculations.8 5 Moreover, curing
79. Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, ScIEmIFC BASES FOR IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL CARCINOGENS AND ESTIMATING THEIR RISKS 13, 70-71 (1979) [hereinafter cited as INTERAGENCY CARCINOGEN STUDY]. Hutt, Quantitative Risk Assessment for Carcinogens, Legal
Times of Washington, Apr. 30, 1979, at 10.
80. INTERAGENCY CARCINOGEN STUDY, supra note 79, at 72-73; Hutt, supra note 79.
81. INTERAGENCY CARCINOGEN STUDY, supra note 79, at 74-85; Hutt supra note 79.
82. INTERAGENCY CARCINOGEN STUDY, supra note 79, at 84-85. See also McGarity, Sub-

stantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729 (1979).
83. INTERAGENCY CARCINOGEN STUDY, supra note 79, at 84.
84. Id. at 13, 95-100.
85. The relative inability of courts to deal with problems of probabilistic causation can
be illustrated by comparing the efforts of centralized regulatory agencies and decentralized
courts to grapple with the problem of carcinogenicity. The agencies have experienced difficulty with the problem and are unable to determine causal relationships with precision
greater than rough statistical approximations. By contrast, however, the courts have proven
totally incapable of dealing with carcinogenicity on even the most fundamental levels. See,
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these deficiencies would be prohibitively expensive because of the
large number of courts and the institutional characteristics of
courts as decisionmakers.
A second advantage enjoyed by a centralized regulatory decisionmaker is the ability to determine the "cause" of accidents by
identification of the entity that can avoid accident costs most effectively and at least cost. As Professor Calabresi has demonstrated, the party causally responsible for a particular type of accident in this sense often is not even before the court in a tort
action. 6 Again, trying to cure this defect in the tort system would
vastly increase its already staggering administrative costs by transforming every tort case into a polycentric dispute of the type the
judicial system simply has not been able to accommodate.8 7 Thus,
while causation remains a major problem in the centralized decisionmaking of regulatory agencies, those agencies are better able to
deal with the problem than courts.
Determining causal relationships, however, is only one of
many problems with the use of CBA. After causal relationships
have been approximated, it is necessary to calculate the magnitude
of costs and benefits using a common denominator, usually dollars.
CBA has been subject to considerable criticism on the basis that it
is much easier to calculate costs of regulation than to calculate
benefits. 88 In fact, calculating either side of the equation is very
difficult, and significant costs of regulation often are omitted.89 To
illustrate the calculation problem, however, I will concentrate on
the benefit side of the equation. Many of the difficulties in translating accident costs into dollars can be demonstrated by considering one recurrent situation-placing a monetary value on the lives
saved as a result of imposing a costly new regulatory requirement.
Two different approaches have been suggested as methods to
value lives saved for purposes of CBA calculations-valuation
e.g., Daly v. Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964); Kramer Serv., Inc. v. Wilkins,
184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1939). See also Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause, 31 Tax.
L. REv. 630 (1953).
86. G. CALADREsi, supra note 4, at 256.
87. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973). See also Pierce, The Choice
Between Adjudication and Rulemaking for Formulatingand Implementing Energy Policy,
31 HASTINas L.J. 1 (1979).

88. E.g., Costle, Stop Demagoguery on Cost-Benefit Analysis, Legal Times of Washington, Apr. 9, 1979, at 32.
89. For instance, CBA rarely includes substantial indirect costs of regulation such as
increased concentration of market power and increased uncertainty that reduces business
investment. On the latter, see generally Pierce, supra note 87, at 21-27.
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methods used in tort law and valuation based upon the conduct of
individuals. The first approach can be disposed of summarily due
to the serious deficiencies discussed previously in tort law's methods of valuing life. Certainly, society would not be comfortable
with safety standards premised, for instance, upon a value of
$28,355 for the life of a child. Thus, evidence based upon individual risk-taking conduct takes on added appeal simply because of
the absence of any other rational basis for valuation.
Many economists have attempted to employ statistical methods to determine the value that individuals implicitly place upon
their lives. In theory, this is relatively simple; it requires merely
analysis of data on the amount of money individuals are willing to
spend or forgo in order to avoid a risk of loss of life. The results of
the studies, however, do not produce consistent valuations. For instance, my review of the literature yielded studies purporting to
show implicit valuations of life of $166,000,' 0 $176,000,91
$199,000, 9 2 $240,000, 9 3 $260,000, 94 $1,500,000,", and $2,600,000."

This relatively wide range of results is not at all surprising. Indeed,
as study in this area begins to focus upon a wider variety of risks,
the range of implicit values is likely to increase. Consider, for instance, the implicit value of life evidenced by the conduct of the
large number of people who refused to venture outdoors, or even
took refuge in caves, in an effort to avoid exposure to the one in six
hundred billion risk of being struck by a piece of Skylab.' A study
of this behavior would conclude that those people placed an implicit value on their lives approaching infinity, even though many
of the same people undoubtedly place a very low implicit value on
their lives routinely by driving without seat belts or at excessive
speeds.
A fundamental problem with using valuations of life implicit
in risk-taking behavior is that the evidence is inconsistent, ambigu90. Blomquist, Value of Life: Implicationsof Automobile Seat Belt Use, University of
Chicago Ph.D. Thesis, reprinted as Urban Economics Report No. 150, 15 (1976).
91. Thaler & Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market,
NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH CONF. ON INCOME AND WEALTH, HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION
AND CONSUMPION (1975).

92.

Id. at 46.

93. Lenard, Lawn Mower Safety, BENEFIr COST ANALYSES OF SOCIAL REGULATION 61,
67 (J. Miller & B. Yandle eds. 1979).
94. Ghosh, Lees & Seal, Optimal Motorway Speed and Some Valuations of Time and
Life, 43 MANCHESTER SCHOOL OF ECON. & SOC. STUD. 134, 141 (1975).
95.

R. SMITH, supra note 37, at 93.

96. Id. at 91.
97. Skylab's Fiery Fall, TIME, July 16, 1979, at 20.
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ous, and often paradoxical. The psychology literature explains the
strange results of the economic studies and suggests serious limits
on the functional utility of such studies. As one psychologist puts
it, "intelligent people systematically violate the principles of rational decisionmaking when judging probabilities, making predictions, or otherwise attempting to cope with probabilistic tasks."'98
The factors that cause individuals to place widely varying implicit
values on their lives include the magnitude of the risk (most people will expose themselves to a one percent risk of death for substantially less than one-fifth of the money they demand for exposure to a five percent risk of death); whether the risk is voluntary
or involuntary; whether the risk is common or unusual (common,
low probability risks of death are often treated as zero risks by
individuals to obtain a greater sense of personal security); the
manner in which the risk is communicated; whether the risk is associated with a particularly vivid or emotive event; and the magnitude of the benefits against which the risk is weighed (but the relationship here is nonlinear).9 9 This leaves the regulator with the
difficult task of deciding which implicit value of life based upon
whose conduct in which risk exposure context should be used in
making CBA calculation. 100
Simply describing the analytical difficulties inherent in valuing
human life suggests another significant problem with the use of
CBA in determining safety standards. There may be a psychic injury to society resulting from the very process of placing an explicit
value on human life. Placing implicit values on human life is an
absolute necessity in all societies, but society rarely admits to
weighing dollars against lives. Even in assessing damages for
wrongful death, courts insist that they are merely providing compensation and disavow any actual valuation of the life lost.10 1 Of
course, society here is engaging in self-deception, but as Professor
Calabresi puts it, "the obvious destruction of myths, when these
are myths of the sort properly termed ideals, is a costly business
e
102
for any society.
98. Slovic, supra note 12, at 99-100.
99. Id. at 100-05. See also G. CALABRasi & P. BOBBrrT, supra note 1, at 116-17.
100. Notwithstanding the conceptual limitations on the use of conduct as a method of
valuing life and the difficulty of selecting an appropriate conduct-based measure, conduct
still appears to provide the best measure of the average individual's valuation of life for

purposes of determining the level of risk to which individuals should be involuntarily subjected. See G. CALABRmsi, supra note 4, at 205-09.
101. E.g., Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 161 So. 85 (1935).
102. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBrrT, supra note 1, at 115.
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There are other costs that flow from the use of CBA as well.
Use of CBA to set safety standards necessarily produces high
transaction costs in the regulatory process. A thorough CBA for a
proposed safety standard requires hundreds of highly skilled manhours. Even assuming that efficient decisionmaking procedures are
used,103 the regulatory system permits (and often, as a practical
matter, demands) that several CBAs be conducted for any proposed standard which is subject to dispute. 0 4 The regulatory
transaction costs become staggering when the quite rational requirement of incremental CBAs and CBAs for proposed alternatives are added. 105
The final major difficulty in establishing safety standards
based on CBA is the tremendous potential for manipulation of the
numerical ratio. As Amory Lovins has persuasively demonstrated,
result-oriented technicians can use a variety of techniques in calculating the CBA to mask what otherwise would be recognized as
blatant biases and analytical errors. 0 ' The often symbiotic relationship between regulators and a narrow constituency causes this
potential abuse of CBA to take on considerable importance.
Throughout the foregoing discussion, I have assumed that a
quantitative decisionmaking aid should be employed to determine
appropriate safety standards for use in direct regulation. There is,
of course, the alternative, supported by many, of relying entirely
upon a combination of subjective decisionmaking and absolute
pursuit of safety. Congress often eschews use of CBA in favor of
subjective absolutism in determining safety standards.07 Four sig103. See generally Pierce, supra note 87.
104. Even the least formal regulatory procedure requires that affected members of the
public be given an opportunity to comment upon and to criticize a proposed regulatory
standard and its basis. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). Hence, to the extent an agency relies upon CBA to
support a proposed standard, parties disagreeing with the standard have little choice but to
compute and submit their own CBAs. Moreover, increasingly one agency of government or
an interagency task force finds it necessary to calculate its own CBA to rebut that of another agency. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE REGULATORY ANALYSIS REVIEW GROUP ON THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE POWERPLANT AND INDUSTRIAL FUEL USE AcT OF 1978 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REVIEW GROUP REPORT]. See
generally BENEFIT-COST ANALYSES OF SocAL REGULATION (J. Miller & B. Yandle eds. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSES].
105. See generally BENEFIT COST ANALYSES, supra note 104. See also Lovins, CostRisk-Benefit Assessments in Energy Policy, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 911, 935 (1977); Simon,
The Business Roundtable Study: What We Did, REGULATION, July-Aug. 1979, at 20.

106. Lovins, supra note 105.
107.

Two examples of statutory provisions which apparently require standards based

upon absolute pursuit of safety are the Delaney Clause of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
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nificant problems with this approach are apparent. First, if the
agency actually follows the absolute safety mandate, the result is
likely to be overspending on some aspects of safety and underspending on others, with a significant net reduction in accident
costs avoided per dollar spent on safety. Second, subjective decisionmaking is as likely to mask biases, errors, and result-oriented
regulation as is decisionmaking aided by CBA. Third, regulators
confronted with a mandate to obtain absolute safety still use some
form of sub rosa quantified balancing. Fourth, when agencies use a
combination of official subjective absolutism and sub rosa quantified balancing, irrational patterns of spending on safety inevitably
evolve.
Actual adherence to an absolute standard of safety in a particular area necessarily produces badly skewed safety spending patterns. It is impossible for society to pursue an absolutist philosophy in all contexts or even to do so with respect to a broad
category of risks, such as involuntary exposure risks. 108 Given this
basic premise, it necessarily follows that total accident costs always
can be reduced by shifting safety spending from an activity in
which absolutism has prevailed to virtually any other activity. This
proposition is very simple to prove using the marginal analysis that
is central to microeconomics.
Subjective decisionmaking has been used effectively for years
as a means of disguising biases and analytical flaws in order to
reach a predetermined result dictated by factors never alluded to
in the decision itself. Just as the good numbers mechanic can engage in mathematical subterfuge, the good verbal mechanic can use
semantic tricks to hide political favoritism, vindictiveness, and incomplete analysis. Indeed, because there is more precision and uniform terminology in the language of mathematics, it is easier to
demonstrate the flaws in a decision reached with the aid of a quantification tool such as CBA than to pierce the artful prose of a
and the provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act that governs standards for
toxic chemicals. The Delaney Clause purports to prohibit as a food additive or as a drug for
food-producing animals any substance that can induce cancer in man or animals. 21 U.S.C.
§§ 348(c)(3)(A), 360(b). See Kleinfeld, The Delaney Proviso-ItsHistory and Prospects, 28
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 556 (1973). OSHA is required to set the standard "which 'Most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his
working life." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). See McGarity, supra note 82, at 785-88.
108. See G. CALABnzsl, supra note 4, at 198-99; G. CALAimzsi & P. BOBBrrT, supra
note 1, at 136-39.
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poorly reasoned but cleverly written subjective decision. Thus, the
manipulation of decisionmaking tools by result-oriented regulators
and technicians must be attacked through more basic changes in
institutional decisionmaking. 109
It is highly unlikely that any agency with an absolutist mandate actually follows that mandate consistently and eschews all efforts to balance the costs and benefits of safety standards. Rather,
agencies make at least rough calculations covertly and disguise the
quantitative basis for their decision through the use of ambiguous
subjective terminology. 110 As a result, the actual basis for the decision is never publicly revealed, the decisionmaking pattern is
grossly distorted by sub rosa calculations in which implicit values
are irrationally determined, and the potential for politically motivated, result-oriented decisions is even greater than in a system
relying explicitly on quantification aids.
OSHA's approach to determining safety standards for toxic
chemicals provides a good example of how the process can work.
OSHA disavows all reliance upon CBA in establishing safety standards. Based upon a reasonably well-supported interpretation of
its organic act, OSHA takes the position that safety standards for
workers are required to provide as much safety as is "feasible,"
and that the concept of feasibility negates any inference that costs
should be balanced against benefits."1 Of course, OSHA is still required to apply the term "feasible" in determining standards. With
some assistance from the courts, OSHA has defined "feasible" as
any standard that will not place a substantial number of affected
employers out of business. 11 2 In other words, what began as an absolutist basis for standards was transformed into a basis dependent
109. See text accompanying notes 138-42 infra.
110. The two most recent past General Counsels of the Food and Drug Administration
have acknowledged candidly FDA's sub rosa use of some form of balancing of costs and
benefits in administering the theoretically absolute standard of the Delaney Clause. Hutt,
supra note 79, at 10; Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the Food and Drug Administration, 45 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 994, 999 (1977). This reaction to putatively absolute standards is common. For instance, when boards charged with allocating access to renal dialysis
facilities were instructed to provide dialysis to anyone with "need" for dialysis, they responded by redefining need to reflect some weighing of costs and benefits. G. CALABRE I &
P. BoBBrrr, supra note 1, at 139.
111. See Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Identification, Classification and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Potential Occupational Carcinogenic
Risk, 41 Fed. Reg. 54,147 (1977).
112. Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But
see Marshall v. American Petroleum Inst., 48 U.S.L.W. 5022 (1980) (holding that OSHA
may not establish a more stringent standard without first finding that the existing standard
exposes workers to significant risks).
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upon determinations of the financial viability of each affected industry and the major firms within that industry. As a result,
OSHA's interpretation still requires use of mathematical aids in
decisionmaking. Only the nature of the calculations and the values
inherent in the results differ from a traditional CBA calculation.
OSHA must analyze such factors as the elasticity of demand
for an industry's product, the liquidity situation and capital structure of an industry, and an industry's access to external sources of
capital. This is a process at least as difficult, expensive, and errorridden as calculating a CBA. Moreover, the implicit valuation of
accident costs yielded by this financial viability criterion can be
truly bizarre. Value of lives saved, for example, is not used as an
input to the calculation; such value is instead an implicit output of
the calculation, with the magnitude of the value depending upon
all the factors that determine the financial viability of an industry
or the major firms within an industry. For an industry whose product has little value to society, the value placed on human life by
the financial viability standard may be only a few dollars. For an
industry whose product has great value to society, the value attached to human life could be scores of millions of dollars. 113 The
allocational implications of the financial viability standard are
even more bizarre. Consumers are given the price signal to increase
their purchases of products with high accident costs and little
value, and to decrease their purchases of products with low accident costs and great value.
It is hard to conjure up a system of accident cost control more
irrational and less reflective of social values than the present tort
system. Congress, however, has proven itself equal to the task
through the values and allocative effects implied in OSHA's organic act. The single virtue of this approach to safety regulation is
its apparent ability to preserve the myth-some would say
ideal-of life's infinite value. One must ask, however, whether
preservation of even such an important myth is worth the tremendous costs-both in dollars and in lives-of selecting a totally irrational method of determining the level and pattern of spending on
safety. Surely there must be a better and more rational way to pre114
serve this important ideal.

113. Review of one recent OSHA standard by the Council on Wage and Price Stability
indicated that the standard reflected an implicit value of life of nine million dollars. Levine,
Exposure to Inorganic Arsenic in the Workplace, BaNEFrr-COST ANALYsEs, supra note 104,

at 27.
114. It is not necessary to accept my views on the desirability of using CBA to estab-
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2. Other Costs and Limits of Direct Regulation
There are problems associated with direct safety regulation in
addition to those encountered in determining safety standards. In
a dynamic economy, significant technological and economic
changes occur rapidly. 115 Yet recalculating CBAs for every conceivable alternative standard in response to changes in economic or
technologic factors is prohibitively expensive. As a result, safety
standards rapidly become obsolete.116
Enforcement too is a major problem of direct regulation. Some
studies have shown that safety standards in the occupational
safety area have no effect whatsoever on the actual level of accident costs. 117 There undoubtedly are circumstances in which some

safety standards have some beneficial effect,118 but the empirical
data on the relationship between safety standards and accident
costs are not encouraging.
There is also considerable evidence that direct safety regulation increases the concentration of market power in an industry.119
Some of this effect probably is attributable to economies of scale in
providing safety and, to that extent, it must be accepted as a consequence of any method of inducing greater safety. Much of the
concentration effect of safety regulation, however, is attributable to
economies of scale in conducting tests, filing reports, and otherwise
complying with the administrative burdens attendant to direct
regulation.
lish regulatory standards in order to accept my conclusion that direct regulation has inherent constraints that make it undesirable as the sole legal tool for encouraging safety. All
that is logically required to accept the latter contention is acceptance of the proposition that
subjective decisionmaking and formal absolutism are not sufficient to determine appropriate
regulatory standards. As the discussion in the text strongly implies, I believe CBA can be a
helpful tool to regulators if its limits are well-understood. Most CBA calculations are so
uncertain that the best that can be expected from them are general indications as to
whether costs and benefits are "in the same ballpark" and identification of areas in which
there is an acute need for additional data. See Kasper, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decisionmaking, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1013, 1021-24 (1977).
115. Id. at 1016-17.
116. FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, at VII-37 to -42.
117. E.g., J. CHELIUS, supra note 16, at 46-48.
118. Even the author of one of the studies that "proved" the total ineffectiveness of
standard-based regulation supports the use of such regulation in some contexts. Id. at 61.
119. BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSES, supra note 104, at 23-24, 72, 83. Tort law also contributes to increased concentration of market power because insurance premiums tend to be
higher for small firms than for large firms. FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, at V-19 to -23. Tort
law's concentration effect, however, is probably not as great as the concentration effect of
direct safety regulation because tort law does not entail the detailed testing and reporting
obligations often imposed by direct regulation.
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Perhaps the most important disadvantage of direct safety regulation is its effect upon individual freedom. Substitution of direct
safety regulation for market-determined levels of safety has significant implications for freedom and the ability of individuals to
choose the mixture of comfort, pleasure, and risk they prefer.
Safety decisions made in the context of direct regulation necessarily are based upon some measure of average or median tastes and
preferences. The individual with a strong aversion to risk or a
strong taste for risk must simply accept that level of risk determined collectively to be acceptable to society. The Pareto optimality and accommodation of individual tastes theoretically attainable
through the market (were it not for externalities and transaction
costs) is impossible to achieve through direct regulation. Some degree of constraint upon individual tastes and freedom is absolutely
essential in any society, but complete abandonment of the market
and internalization of accident costs in all areas of safety would
force reliance upon direct regulation so pervasive as to undermine
totally the individual freedom so highly prized in our society. The
new approach to safety in Australia and New Zealand inevitably
will have this effect. Tort law in the United States, with all its
inefficiencies, ultimately will produce the same result unless a more
effective method of internalizing accident costs can be devised.
V. A PROPOSED NEW APPROACH TO SAFETY
In prior sections, I have demonstrated that the market for
safety is ineffective largely because tort law is ineffective as a
means of internalizing the costs of accidents to those who can control those costs, and direct regulation is ineffective largely because
it is difficult to determine and enforce safety standards. Both
mechanisms for controlling accident costs also have undesirable
side effects. For activities that produce significant beneficial externalities tort law can produce a serious misallocation of resources. 12 0
Tort law also has very high transaction costs and produces implicit
values of human life that differ markedly from social values. Direct
regulation subordinates individual freedom to collective tastes.
Furthermore, where regulatory techniques require an explicit valu120. Direct regulation also can produce misallocation of resources resulting from increased safety-related costs imposed upon activities with high beneficial externalities. It is
unlikely, however, that the distortions created by direct regulation are as great, since the
centralized regulatory decisionmaking process is more capable of accommodating and reflecting beneficial externalities than are courts. It is common for regulatory CBAs to include
quantification of externalities. See, e.g., REVIEW GRouP REPORT, supra note 104.
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ation of human life, there is a danger of psychic injury to society;
on the other hand, when the regulators rely on implicit values of
human life, the results are even less reflective of social values than
those produced by tort law. I have also demonstrated that the deficiencies in the present methods of encouraging safety are so deeply
embedded that they are impervious to incremental changes in the
systems. Thus, tinkering with the existing mechanisms is futile.
One has to ask, then, whether an alternative mechanism can be
devised that will encourage safety more effectively at a lower administrative cost and that will also tolerably reflect social values. I
believe the question can be answered affirmatively. Although the
mechanism I propose cannot produce an optimal market for safety
in the Pareto optimality sense, I firmly believe that society can improve its methods of dealing with the difficult safety problem by
establishing a new institutional framework for government control
of safety that responds to the most significant deficiencies in the
present institutions with solutions that have proven effective in
other contexts. 2 1
A.

Outline of the Proposal

The proposal has as its core the creation of a large new federal
agency. This characteristic may detract from the political appeal of
the proposal in some quarters, but the ultimate effect of creating
one large agency of the type proposed would be to eliminate many
existing agencies and decrease the need for direct safety regulation.
For the purposes of this Article, the proposed agency will be
referred to as the Safety Enhancement and Compensation Agency
(SECA). SECA would both compensate victims of accidents and
regulate safety in all areas of the economy. In performing its compensation role, it would share many characteristics of the Accident
Compensation Boards now functioning in New Zealand and pro121. Professor Franklin proposed a somewhat similar mechanism for replacing the tort
system, although he based his proposal upon a different perception of the flaws in the tort
system. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774 (1967). My proposal differs from Professor Franklin's in several respects, the most important of which are (1) I would integrate safety regulation in the
same agency that has responsibility for accident cost compensation and assessment; and (2)
while Professor Franklin emphasizes general tax revenues as the primary source of funds for
the compensation scheme with supplementary use of selective reimbursement, I would maximize the use of specific cost assessments on activities and firms with supplementary use of
general tax revenues. Implicitly, my proposal reflects a greater sense of need to internalize
accident costs to encourage safety.
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posed in Australia.12 2 It would differ materially from those agencies, however, in its source of compensation funds. Some of its
funding undoubtedly would have to be obtained from general revenues, but one of the agency's primary tasks would be to internalize
costs of accidents to the maximum extent possible to entities in
the best position to control those costs. Its power to impose direct
safety standards would be supplementary to its power to internalize accident costs.
B. Advantages of the Proposal
1. Providing Compensation
In determining the appropriate compensation for an accident,
SECA would attempt to pursue only the goals of compensation and
minimization of secondary accident costs to victims. The compensation decision would be unrelated to the safety enhancement goal
of tort law except to the extent that encouraging safety suggests
the need for accident victims to bear some of the costs of accidents. 1 28 This simplification of goals alone could drastically increase the agency's effectiveness in accomplishing its mission.
Fault would be eliminated as a factor in determining eligibility for
compensation except in the extremely rare class of cases in which
the agency concludes that it actually can deter unsafe individual
conduct by refusing compensation for injuries resulting from certain conduct.' 2' The amount of compensation would be determined
through generic formulas similar to those used for workers' compensation awards and for awards by the New Zealand and Austra122. See text accompanying notes 71-77 and note 72 supra.
123. There are two reasons why victims should bear some of the costs of accidents.
First, it is extremely difficult to calculate subjective costs such as pain and suffering. Moreover, the subjectivity of these costs renders them particularly appropriate as a means of
encouraging accident avoidance through individual conduct of potential victims. See G. CALABREsi, supra note 4, at 222-24. Second, a modest portion of objectively determinable costs,
such as lost wages, should not be compensated to reduce the potential for malingering and
fraudulent claims. Comparative studies have shown a higher accident rate in jurisdictions
with high workers' compensation benefits than in jurisdictions with lower benefits. J. CHHLIUs, supra note 16, at 45-46. The author of the study drew the inference that higher benefits produce more careless workers. I find such an inference highly implausible, but draw the
alternative inference that higher benefits produce more malingering and frauduleni accident
claims. In either event, the data suggests the need for victims to retain a portion of the
purely monetary costs of accidents.
124. I am not convinced that such a class of accidents exists. It is possible, however,
that accidents encompassed within the most narrow definition of assumption of risk fall
within such a category. See Carr v. Pacific Telephone Co., 26 Cal. App. 3d 537, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 120 (1972).
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lian Accident Compensation Boards.
The net effect would be to make compensation more prompt
and more certain, with the lottery characteristics of tort compensation eliminated. This, in turn, would produce better secondary accident cost avoidance. At the same time, the horrendous transaction costs of the tort system would be greatly reduced through
elimination of the need to make tens of thousands of individual
decisions on such nebulous issues as fault, level of future earnings,
monetary value of pain and suffering, and value of lost consortium,
companionship, etc. A few facts would remain as possible sources
of dispute, 125 but it would be a rare case in which expensive trial
type procedures would be required to resolve fact questions that
would remain important to compensation decisions.126
2. Cost Internalization
Conversely, compensation and secondary cost minimization
would be irrelevant to the agency's cost internalization goal. In
working toward cost internalization, the agency would be given a
statutory mandate to assess accident costs to the parties best able
to control the costs of particular types of accidents.127 SECA also
would be authorized to spread accident costs over time and among
entities to the extent required to reduce secondary accident costs
among those entities in a position to control primary accident
costs. In this manner it would serve both a cost assessment and a
compulsory insurance function.
The agency would be required to accumulate data on accident
costs by type of activity and, when possible, by the firms whose
products or services were involved in accidents. Data collection
would be greatly facilitated by the agency's compensation activities. Raw data on the nature and severity of accidents collected in
conjunction with compensation decisions would be the starting
point for the accident cost assessment procedure, but the valuation
125. Extent of disability and cause of disability still would require resolution by the
new agency. The latter, however, could be determined statistically for entire groups of accidents based upon data provided in victims' requests for compensation. Since the availability
and magnitude of compensation would not depend upon resolution of causal issues, the data
related to causation reported in compensation claims could be relied upon in subsequent
statistical determinations of cause without concern for the veracity and objectivity of
victims.
126. Due process does not require adjudicatory procedures when the issues in dispute
relate to degree of disability. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
127. I cannot improve upon the criteria for imposing accident costs identified by Professor Calabresi. See G. CALABRxsI, supra note 4, at 140-65.
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of costs for compensation purposes would not carry over as the valuation for cost assessment purposes. To avoid the anomalies that
could result from internalizing compensation-related valuations-for example, children's lives worth less than adults, laborers' lives worth less than executives-a generic set of accident consequence valuations would be used to determine the aggregate
accident costs associated with any industry or activity. 1 8 Those aggregate costs then would be divided among firms in the industry in
proportion to the involvement of the products and services of each
firm in accidents, except to the extent that secondary loss minimization or inability to determine individual firm involvement dictate
an assessment of costs among firms or over time.
Determining causation would remain an important and difficult job of the agency, but there are many institutional reasons to
believe that SECA could perform this job more efficiently and effectively than the several thousand courts to which this responsibility is now entrusted. First, it is much easier to deal with probabilistic and joint causation in the aggregate than to cope with these
problems in individual cases. Second, the focus of the causation
inquiry would be very different in the agency's decisionmaking. Instead of analyzing minutiae concerning the extent to which factors
like common carelessness contributed to a particular accident, the
agency would concentrate on identifying causally responsible entities in the broader sense-i.e., those entities in the best position to
reduce accident costs. Third, the agency would have far better access to data and calculational skills relevant to determining causation than would any court. Fourth, the total transaction costs of
internalizing accident costs would be greatly reduced by eliminating some types of factual disputes and centralizing the others in a
single decisionmaking body that could, for example, with one decision concerning the assessment of costs associated with lawnmowers, accomplish the same task that now requires hundreds of
judicial decisions.
Examples of the manner in which the agency would treat two
very different types of accidents-lung cancer fatalities and motorcycle accident fatalities-illustrate the general operation of the
proposed agency. The dependent survivors of lung cancer victims
would be entitled to receive compensation from the agency. The
128. For this purpose, an average market value of life based upon risk-taking conduct
probably provides the best measure of loss of life as an accident cost notwithstanding its
limitations. See text accompanying notes 98-104 and note 100 supra.
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formula for calculating the amount of compensation would be predetermined in a manner similar to workers' compensation systems
and the Australian/New Zealand Accident Compensation Boards.
Since compensation would be available for all dependent survivors,
a very high percentage of accidents would be the subject of compensation claims. 2 9
The information provided in the compensation claims would
be designed to serve two different purposes. First, the claims would
include the information necessary to determine the amount of
compensation-e.g., victim's salary and identity of dependents.
Second, they would contain information useful to the agency in
identifying the causes of lung cancer-e.g., victim's occupation,
employer, place of business, location of residence, work history, locational history, and smoking habits. Based upon statistical analysis of the data provided in compensation claims, SECA could draw
inferences concerning the causes of lung cancer using Professor
Calabresi's functional definition of cause.
Accident cost assessments would then be made against industries and activities identified as causally responsible for lung cancer. For instance, statistical analysis of data provided in compensation claims might support an inference that sixty percent of lung
cancer is "caused" by smoking, twenty percent by occupational
and environmental hazards associated with the steel industry, and
twenty percent by other activities that cannot yet be identified.
The agency would assess the costs of lung cancer fatalities to the
cigarette and steel industries based upon the formula: total lives
lost x percentage of deaths attributable to each industry x predetermined value of loss of life. Assuming 10,000 fatalities resulting
from lung cancer and a standard value of life of $500,000, the cigarette industry would be assessed three billion dollars, and the steel
industry one billion.13 0 The assessment to each industry would be
129. Only dependent survivors of an accident victim would be entitled to full compensation. However, it probably would be necessary to provide for nominal compensation, say
$500, to a nondependent survivor of a victim with no dependent survivors eligible for full
compensation. The sole purpose of creating this additional beneficiary of the compensation
scheme is to ensure that there is always someone with an incentive to file a compensation
claim in a fatal accident situation. Otherwise, the agency would not obtain data related to
the cause of death of accident victims not survived by dependents. Such a gap in the
agency's data pool would undermine its ability to internalize accident costs through the
assessment process and to determine causal relationships.
130. This hypothetical illustration includes only loss of life as an accident cost. The
same procedure would be used to provide compensation for, and assessments of, accident
costs other than loss of life. Again, a set of predetermined standard costs of generic consequences of accidents would be used for cost assessment purposes to provide data rapidly
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apportioned among firms in the industry in proportion to their
causal involvement to the extent that statistical analysis of claims
information could support reasonable inferences of causal relationships specific to firms. SECA would then have the option of
spreading costs over time in order to reduce dislocation costs to
firms or industries experiencing atypical or catastrophic accident
costs during a particular period. In addition, it could assess costs
in advance of their occurrence based upon actuarial projections of
future costs attributable to present activities.
Through this method of cost assessment and compensation,
the average accident cost assessment per life lost would exceed the
average compensation paid to survivors. The excess revenue resulting from this process would be available to the compensation fund
to provide at least a substantial portion of the money required to
compensate victims and survivors of victims in circumstances
where the agency's data is insufficient to permit reasonable causal
inferences or where the existence of beneficial externalities requires the agency to assess only a portion of accident costs to a
causally responsible activity. This excess assessment revenue
would reduce the amount of money required from general revenues
to maintain the compensation fund.
The agency would use a similar approach to fatal motorcycle
accidents, but here the causation problem is somewhat different.
Again, all surviving dependents would receive compensation based
on a predetermined formula, and the compensation claims would
be used both as a source of data to determine the amount of compensation and as a source of data from which broad causal inferences could be drawn. Based on prior studies of motorcycle accidents, we already know that over fifty percent of fatalities are
attributable to the failure of automobile operators to yield the
right-of-way to motorcyclists and that this failure to yield the
right-of-way is, in turn, the result of the failure of automobile operators to see motorcycles. '13 Thus, using Professor Calabresi's approach, it is fair to infer that the functional cause of these accidents is not negligent failure to yield the right-of-way, as the tort
system now concludes. Rather, it is the fact that motorcycles are
not visible to automobile operators. Motorcycle manufacturers appear to be in the best position to avoid these accidents through
modifications in lighting and paint selection. Therefore, the full
and with low transaction costs.
131. See note 62 supra.
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cost of this class of accidents would be assessed to motorcycle
manufacturers in proportion to the involvement of each manufacturer's products in accidents of this type.
There is ample reason to expect the agency's accident cost assessments to be more effective than tort damage actions in creating
a market for safety. In addition to its superior ability to determine
accident cause by reference to the criterion of least-cost accidentcost avoider, the agency also would be better positioned actuarially
than liability insurers. It could, in effect, "loss rate" a great many
more entities in carrying out its cost assessment and compulsory
insurance functions, 3 2 thereby reducing the cost externalization
now attributable to insufficient subcategorization of accident costs
by providers of liability insurance. In addition, the certainty of
SECA's cost internalization requirement would reduce the "Faust
effect" that is particularly troublesome in small and medium-sized
firms.
The agency would also be actuarially superior to present-day
liability insurers. Rather than relying upon fault-based claims for
compensation as its basic source of accident data, SECA could rely
upon the no-fault compensation claims it processes. As a result,
the agency should obtain about five times as much data on accident occurrence as the liability insurer now obtains during a comparable period.13 3 Moreover, the costs of each accident would be
calculated immediately by reference to the standard accident consequence valuation table, rather than having to await cost data resulting from often-protracted judicial proceedings. These characteristics assure the agency of greatly improved accident cost data;
and adequate data, of course, are at the core of the actuarial
process.
The agency would not only have superior access to accident
cost data, but the data collected would be more useful as a basis
for predicting future accident costs. One of the major factors confounding insurance actuaries is the large measure of uncertainty
inherent in complex tort litigation. Because of the tort lottery, historical accident cost data associated with a firm as a result of past
132. Loss-rating refers to the process of determining the future accident costs applicable to a firm or product through statistical analysis of its historical accident costs. Because
of the uncertainties and delays attendant to determination of accident costs through the
tort system, only a small fraction of liability insurance is now available on a loss-rated basis.
See notes 44-51 supra and accompanying text.
133. The accident cost data also could be expected to be more accurate than that obtained through the fault-based tort system. See note 37 supra.
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tort litigation are not good predictors of the firm's future accident
costs. With the elimination of these complexities, SECA would
have data that are far more useful in the actuarial process.
The agency could further enhance allocative efficiency by considering explicitly the existence of beneficial externalities or paradoxical comparative advantage effects associated with an activity
in determining whether to assess to that activity or the entities
carrying out the activity the full costs of accidents that the activity
is best positioned to control.1 34 For instance, surgeons might be assessed only a fraction of the accident costs attributable to surgery.
The process of discounting accident costs to reflect the existence of
beneficial externalities or undesirable international trade consequences is difficult, but it can be accomplished much more accurately and effectively by a central decisionmaker with access to aggregate data and sophisticated calculation tools than by thousands
of individual judges dealing only with discrete incidents.
The dramatic decrease in accident costs (and associated administrative costs) that accompanied the transition from tort law
to workers' compensation demonstrates the potential benefits attainable through the proposed accident cost compensation
agency.1 5 Indeed, there are two reasons to expect even greater results from creation of a general accident cost compensation agency.
First, careful structuring of the new agency could avoid some of
the imperfections that have become apparent in workers' compensation schemes,13 6 thus permitting more effective internalization of
134. See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra.
135. J. CHELius, supra note 16, at 44-45.
136. Even though workers' compensation has greatly increased safety in the workplace
by internalizing a higher proportion of accident costs to those who are in a position to reduce those costs, it continues to fall well short of its theoretical capability because some
costs still are not internalized. Two factors are primarily responsible for this incomplete
internalization. First, workers' compensation costs are linked to the level of benefits, which
do not reflect full accident costs. See Olson, Selected Mechanisms for Insuring Product
Liability, in SELECTED PAsERs, supra note 33, at 30. This flaw would be eliminated in the
organic act establishing the new agency through two devices. First, benefits would be subject
to adjustment for inflation. Second, valuation for accident cost assessment purposes would
not be linked to valuation for benefit purposes. Thus, even if the agency concluded that
benefits associated with a class of accidents should be limited to, for instance, eighty percent
of lost earnings in order to discourage malingering and fraudulent claims, the assessment of
costs for that class of accidents still would reflect the full costs of the accidents measured by
an average market value standard.
The second factor that contributes to the externalization of accident costs in the workers' compensation systems is the use of a narrow definition of cause in occupational disease
cases. See J. CHELIUS, supra note 16, at 22-24. It has been reported that less than ten percent of the victims of occupational disease ever receive workers' compensation benefits. An-
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accident costs. Second, the modern tort system that SECA would
replace is far more complex and administratively costly than the
tort system that was replaced by workers' compensation. 13 7 As a
result, even greater proportionate reductions in administrative
costs could be expected.
3. Direct Regulation by the Agency
Until now, the description of SECA has focused entirely upon
its compensation and accident cost internalization functions. By
performing the latter function more effectively than tort law, the
agency could reduce significantly, but definitely not eliminate, the
need for direct government safety regulation. Realistically, no matter how effectively the agency internalized costs, there would still
be a need for some direct regulation in some areas.
The agency would be empowered to engage in direct safety
regulation with respect to any activity. In determining whether to
supplement cost internalization with direct regulation, the agency
would consider two issues: (1) Is the combination of the market
and the agency's forced internalization of accident costs effectively
encouraging accident cost avoidance? and (2) If the answer to the
first question is no, can safety in this activity be enhanced more
effectively through changes in the methods of forced cost internalization or through direct regulation? SECA would thus be given a
mandate to use accident cost internalization as its primary means
of encouraging safety, with direct regulation relegated to a supplementary role.
One of the major beneficial effects of the proposal would be a
marked reduction in the problems associated with direct safety
regulation. Since the agency would rely primarily on cost internalization techniques, the private and social costs attributable to promulgation and enforcement of rigid safety standards would be reduced. Moreover, regulatory decisionmaking requires explicit
valuation of human life-a process that may result in psychic injury to society-whereas SECA's cost assessment approach will not
have the same negative consequences.1 31 Perhaps most important,
derson, Workmen's CompensationLaws Hit, The Washington Post, Sept. 3, 1979, at B30.
This flaw could be corrected by adopting Professor Calabresi's much broader definition of
cause. See G. CALABRESi, supra note 4, at 140-65.
137. See generally Henderson, supra note 87.
138. The agency's accident cost assessment function would, of course, require valuation of life. Some means of valuing life is essential to any societal program to encourage
safety. Valuation of life for accident cost assessment purposes, however, is more acceptable
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individual freedom to take risks in order to pursue valued goals
would be preserved to the maximum extent consistent with the
need to confront individuals with the full societal costs of their
decisions.12 9
Even with respect to the direct regulation function of the
agency, there are three reasons to expect performance superior to
that of existing regulatory agencies. First, the accident cost data
gathered by the agency on an ongoing basis through its compensation and cost assessment activities would be useful in determining
whether direct regulation of an activity is needed and in determining appropriate regulatory standards. Incremental CBAs could be
performed without incurring extraordinary transaction costs because the relevant data already would be in the agency's possession. Second, replacing the multitude of overlapping agencies with
a single, broad safety agency would enhance decisionmaking efficiency. For instance, instead of having four teams of government
specialists attempting to determine carcinogenic dose-response rethan the explicit balancing of lives against dollars required in establishing safety standards.
Indeed, the valuations of life for cost purposes would appear to have the same indirect effect
on safety as valuations in wrongful death actions. Thus, the legal system could avoid psychic
harm to society by continuing to distinguish between explicit balancing of lives and dollars
and mere valuation of life for cost assessment purposes. This apparent refusal to link lives
and money is the critical factor in minimizing psychic harm.
139. There are occasional circumstances when individual freedom might actually be
furthered by choosing direct regulation over accident cost internalization. Where a specific
recurrent form of conduct accounts for a very high proportion of the costs of a class of
accidents, and that form of conduct can be effectively banned, freedom may actually be
enhanced by prohibiting the conduct directly rather than internalizing its costs to the broad
activity in which it takes place. This is true because even the new agency would have limited
ability to subcategorize activities for cost assessment purposes. As a result, assessment of
costs to broad activities could inhibit freedom by increasing one group's costs of engaging in
the activity by forcing them to assume costs attributable entirely to the recurrent conduct of
another group. See G. CALABREsi, supra note 4, at 105. The wearing of motorcycle helmets
illustrates the point well. A very high percentage of motorcycle accident costs are attributable to head injuries that could be avoided if the rider were wearing a helmet. Ideally, accident costs attributable to the rider's failure to wear a helmet should be assessed in such a
manner that only those who ride without helmets bear these costs. Individual freedom
would be furthered by such an allocation in the sense that people could choose to pay a
higher price to engage in an activity with higher accident costs. It would be extremely difficult and costly, however, to subcategorize motorcycle accident costs in this manner. As a
result, internalization of motorcycle accident costs would force all who engage in the activity-with or without helmets-to pay costs attributable only to those who choose to ride
without helmets. Many individuals who would wear a helmet are prevented from riding
motorcycles because the costs created by the other group make motorcycle riding prohibitively expensive. It is at least arguable that individual freedom would be furthered in this
situation by direct prohibition of motorcycle riding without a helmet. This illustrates one of
the circumstances in which the agency should choose direct regulation over modifications to
its accident cost assessment procedure.
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lationships for regulatory purposes, a single team of government
scientists and statisticians in the new agency would be given responsibility for this difficult task. 140 Third, an agency with broad
jurisdiction over all areas of safety regulation would engender
greater trust in the fairness and objectivity of the regulatory process. As Professor Noll has demonstrated, "capture" of an agency
by a narrow constituency uniquely affected by its decisions is much
less likely when an agency has broad jurisdiction over a variety of
activities.1 41 Thus, to a large extent, creation of an agency with
broad jurisdiction over safety would moot the debate over whether
quantification provides a means of assuring the rationality of regulatory decisions or merely provides result-oriented decisionmakers
a new means of disguising their errors and biases. Moreover, creating a single safety agency with broad jurisdiction would decrease
the need for the use of costly and cumbersome decisionmaking
procedures by providing an institutional forum in which there is
greater assurance of neutrality. As Judge Friendly has persuasively
argued, a neutral decisionmaker serves so many due process values
effectively that many other procedural safeguards can be omitted if
the neutrality of the decisionmaker is assured. 42
VI.

CONCLUSION

The proposal made in this Article is not likely to garner immediate support from any quarter. It may be characterized accurately
as the kind of attempt at major social and economic engineering
that the legal system has proven unable to implement in many
other contexts. Yet, I would not prescribe such a major revamping
of the legal system's methods of controlling safety if I did not find
the underlying ailment both chronic and potentially fatal. For a
variety of reasons, the market alone is no longer capable of effectively encouraging safety in a large and growing number of areas.
Tort law has proven an abysmal failure at accomplishing its putative goals. Furthermore, the market and tort law will become even
more ineffective as social, economic, and scientific relationships
grow more complex and the nation embarks on other experiments
in social engineering, such as national health insurance. If the present situation is permitted to evolve naturally, the inevitable result
140.

To some extent, existing safety agencies have already recognized the advantages

of joint efforts. See, e.g.,
141.
(1971).
142.

INTERAGENCY CARCINOGEN STUDY,

supra note 79.

See Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L. REv. 1016, 1032
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-80 (1975).
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will be total externalization of accident costs. When combined with
a justifiable desire to decrease accident costs, this complete externalization, in turn, will force total reliance upon direct safety regulation. The implications of relying entirely upon direct regulation
as a means of encouraging safety are frightening. Direct regulation
by itself cannot control accident costs. Moreover, increases in regulatory authority threaten the present structure of the U.S. economy and, most importantly, individual freedom. The solution I
propose may not be the best, and undoubtedly it requires considerable refinement. Unless we consider seriously some such major
change in our methods of controlling safety, however, I fear a future society that is faceless and grey and a future economy that is
so sluggish as to be incapable of responding to dynamic international economic forces.

